Precious faith considered in its nature, working, and growth

But you will say, if the minor stands upon sense and experience, how can the conclusion, which imports assurance, be de fide? And Bellarmine argues thus.¹ Nothing can be certain with a certainty of faith, unless ⟨p. 147⟩it be contained in the word of God, upon which if it lean not, it is not faith, but that such or such a man is justified in particular, is not contained in the word, neither can it be deduced from thence; for then I must argue thus, the word saith, All that truly turn to God shall find mercy, but I do truly turn to him, therefore I am sure of mercy, in which the minor is not in the word. By the way we may observe what an excellent foundation the Jesuit lays for his disputation, Fides non est, nisi verbi divini auctoritate nitatur, that is not faith, which is not bottomed on the authority of the divine word. Oh rare! if this were believed, what would become of Popery? What of all the hay and stubble of their vain Traditions? Why do they play the wily Gibeonites with their old bottles and clouted shoes, obtruding their unwritten verities and mouldy customs upon the Church of God? I can be assured of no Religion, which is not founded on Scripture. But for answer, The certainty of the Doctrine of Faith, which respects the whole Church, is to be found in the Scripture; but the certainty of an act of Faith, which is in a particular man, is to be found in the heart by spiritual sense and experience; and so in Bellarmines minor, the certainty of my turning to God stands not upon the word, but upon spiritual sense and experience; yet nevertheless the conclusion, ⟨p. 148⟩which imports assurance, is de fide; for every conclusion is so, which stands upon one proposition contained in Scripture, and upon another gathered from sense or experience, as the case is in all such practical Syllogisms: yet withal, as I said at first, the conclusion doth not stand so entirely on Scripture as a direct act of faith doth.

But you will say, if the minor stands upon sense and experience, how can the conclusion, which imports assurance, be de fide? And Bellarmine argues thus.¹ Nothing can be certain with a certainty of faith, unless