A55308:266
Speculum theologiæ in Christo, or, A view of some divine truths which are either…
Speculum theologiæ in Christo, or, A view of some divine truths which are either practically exemplified in Jesus Christ, set forth in the Gospel, or may be reasonably deduced from thence / by Edward Polhill ..., Esq.
London: printed by A.M. and R.R. for Tho. Cockerill, 1678
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
These things being laid down in general, I come now to answer this Objection in that instance which is above all other, The Sufferings of our Saviour. The blackest iniquity that ever the Sun saw, was the crucifying of him who was God manifested in the flesh; and yet here Providence did not stand off, or at a distance, but ordered his sufferings to bring forth the great work of Redemption. On mans part there was malice, blood, and unparalleled wickedness; yet on Gods there was justice, righteousness, and a design of incomparable love to save the world: Hence it is said, That Herod, and Pilate, and the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together to do whatsoever Gods hand and Gods counsel determined before to be done, Acts 4.27, 28. Never was there so horrible a sin, never so signal a Providence as here. Some Divines do here distinguish thus: The passion of Christ was decreed, but the crucifiers action was not. Others will not admit this distinction. Beza against Castellio says, That common sense is against it. Chamier thinks that natural light is against it. I confess that I cannot satisfy my self with it. Are the Action and Passion really distinct? May the one be without the other? May Providence be, as becomes it, perfect, if it determine an Effect without a Cause; or that ⟨p. 196⟩Christ should be slain, and not by whom? A scheme of one Decree hath been let down from Heaven to us, whose accuracy is considerable, 1 King. 22. there God did not only decree that Ahab should be persuaded to go up and fall at Ramoth-Gilead, but that it should be done by the hardest medium, by a Lying-spirit commissionated to go and prevail. And may we think Providence more accurate touching a judgment on one wicked man, than it is touching the Redemption of the World by Christ? and yet will it not be more accurate, if in the one the mode and person by whom the thing should be done, be designed, and not in the other? Suppose the Action and Passion to be distinct, yet is not the Passion a dependent on the Action? And if the Action be casual, must not the Passion be so too? And if the Passion only be decreed, must not the Action be casual? That Action which is altogether undecreed (I mean, there being no Decree of permission upon which the Action as a consequent doth ensue) is undetermined by God;