The position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistibleness of converting…The position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistiblenesse of converting…

3. There is an Irresistibleness, whereby the Will assents unto this Physical motion proceeding from Grace, as also to the persuasion of the Understanding, approving of it, and that necessarily or certainly: And this kind of Irresistibleness, we say, may very well stand with Liberty, because it comprehends in it self those two things in which Liberty stands.

3. There is an Irresistiblenesse, whereby the Will assents unto this Physicall motion proceeding from Grace, as also to the perswasion of the Understanding, approving of it, and that necessarily or certainely: And this kinde of Irresistiblenesse, we say, may very well stand with Liberty, because it comprehends in it selfe those two things in which Liberty stands.

1. That the Will in putting forth this last act of willing, is active, and not passive.

2. Because the moral persuasion, or judgement of the Understanding, thinking that the conversion propounded, that is, either the taking or refusing the object offered, is in the power of man, hath gone before. For we hold, That whatsoever is done in the act of Conversion, either by a mere Reception, or by a physical (or powerful) Determination, is not free. But that every willing is only so far free as it is produced in an active way, and flows from a reasonable persuasion; and that upon this ground, that reason lies indifferent to things opposite, that is, Reason only is the root and foundation of all Liberty; from whence it follows, that every act of the Will, into which Reason hath its influence, is most free.

2. Because the morall perswasion, or judgement of the Understanding, thinking that the conversion propounded, that is, either the taking or refusing the object offered, is in the power of man, hath gone before. For we hold, That whatsoever is done in the act of Conversion, either by a meere Reception, or by a physicall (or powerfull) Determination, is not free. But that every willing is only so far free as it is produced in an active way, and flowes from a reasonable perswasion; and that upon this ground, that reason lies indifferent to things opposite, that is, Reason onely is the root and foundation of all Liberty; from whence it followes, that every act of the Will, into which Reason hath its influence, is most free.