A55751:79
The position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistibleness of converting…The position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistiblenesse of converting…
The position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistibleness of converting graceThe position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistiblenesse of converting grace
London: printed by J.G. for Nath. Webb and Will. Grantham, 1654
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
5. I will ask what is that which makes a man truly holy and Godly, not simply acts good and godly; for (as the Philosopher says) Acts do not denominate the subject to be such: it must therefore be some habit, by virtue of which a man is called godly and holy: But that habit is not placed in the irrational part of the soul, for that is not properly capable of Virtue or Vice, but only by Participation: to wit, so far as the rational part of the soul redounds upon it. But if it must be placed in the rational part, it must not be in the understanding; for no man is good or evil, only because he understandeth good and evil things (as Aquinas very well observes) but therefore is one called a good or evil man, because he wills those things which are good and evil. It remaineth therefore, that the habit of holiness cannot be placed any where but in the will, as being the subject most properly capable, both of habitual holiness, as also of habitual corruption and rebellion, which is contrary thereunto.
5. I will aske what is that which makes a man truly holy and Godly, not simply acts good and godly; for (as the Philosopher sayes) Acts doe not denominate the subject to be such: it must therefore be some habit, by vertue of which a man is called godly and holy: But that habit is not placed in the irrationall part of the soule, for that is not properly capable of Vertue or Vice, but onely by Participation: to wit, so farre as the rationall part of the soule redounds upon it. But if it must be placed in the rationall part, it must not be in the understanding; for no man is good or evill, onely because he understandeth good and evill things (as Aquinas very well observes) but therefore is one called a good or evill man, because he wills those things which are good and evill. It remaineth therefore, that the habit of holinesse cannot be placed any where but in the will, as being the subject most properly capable, both of habituall holinesse, as also of habituall corruption and rebellion, which is contrary thereunto.
6. If the Will be indifferent in it self, and equally inclined unto either part; whence is that facility and promptitude in working? for as by evil actions the Will contracts a stain whereby it is habitually disposed unto evil; so by good actions the soul is touched with a better tincture, whereby it is habitually inclined unto good, and that setting aside the operation of moving and exciting Grace.