The position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistibleness of converting…The position of John Preston, Doctor in Divinity ... concerning the irresistiblenesse of converting…

Let this be the fist and last reason. If conversion be wrought after that resistible manner, as is described by them who follow Arminius, then Divine election cannot be certain according to their principles, because it dependeth on the mutable will of man, which as it is described by Arminius, I dare say, could not be foreseen by God himself; for let it be supposed (which they lay) as the foundation of that prevision that God doth perfectly foresee all the ways whereby the will may be turned aside, or inclined unto good: Let it also be supposed that God fore-knows all objects, or circumstances, which may any way be offered or proposed to the will. Lastly, let it also be supposed, that God doth perfectly know how every object or circumstance is fit to move the will, and drive it this way, or that way, by persuasion. Yet if this be the condition of the will, that allowing any objects, yea further, allowing any fitness in these objects or circumstances, to incline the will this way, or that way; it may yet, by virtue of its intrinsical liberty act, or not act, I see not how God can foresee what the will certainly and infallibly will do, that is, whether it will turn to God or not. Not that God, by reason of any impotency is not able to search out what the will shall endeavour, but because the thing it self is not knowable. For there cannot be greater certainty in the knowledge than in the object, from whence I thus reason. If it be certain that the will shall assent unto grace offered, then it ⟨p. 18⟩is falsely said, that the Will supposing all the actions of God that are requisite, may turn it self, or not? On the other side, if it be uncertain, whether the will shall resist this grace, or not, then that foreknowledge which God hath of it, cannot be certain, for that which is to be known is the measure of knowledge, and therefore it is a contradiction to say, that the knowledge is true, and yet there is more certainty in the knowledge than in the thing known. As it implies a contradiction to say, that the thing measured is greater or less then the measure, and yet to be equal to it; I add, although it be true, that God knows all the ways, according to which, the will may be well or ill inclined.

Let this be the fist and last reason. If conversion be wrought after that resistible manner, as is described by them who follow Arminius, then Divine election cannot be certaine according to their principles, because it dependeth on the mutable will of man, which as it is described by Arminius, I dare say, could not be foreseene by God himselfe; for let it be supposed (which they lay) as the foundation of that praevision that God doth perfectly foresee all the wayes whereby the will may be turned aside, or inclined unto good: Let it also be supposed that God fore-knowes all objects, or circumstances, which may any way be offered or proposed to the will. Lastly, let it also be supposed, that God doth perfectly know how every object or circumstance is fit to move the will, and drive it this way, or that way, by perswasion. Yet if this be the condition of the will, that allowing any objects, yea further, allowing any fitnesse in these objects or circumstances, to incline the will this way, or that way; it may yet, by vertue of its intrinsecall liberty act, or not act, I see not how God can foresee what the will certainly and infallibly will doe, that is, whether it will turne to God or not. Not that God, by reason of any impotency is not able to search out what the will shall endeavour, but because the thing it selfe is not knowable. For there cannot be greater certainty in the knowledge than in the object, from whence I thus reason. If it be certaine that the will shall assent unto grace offered, then it