5. No Ecclesiastical power, or acts formally Ecclesiastical, are competent to one who is not an Ecclesiastical person, or not a member of the Church, but a civill person; but a power to define in Synods, and the exercise of acts Ecclesiastical and matters Ecclesiastical, are due to Ecclesiastical persons, and to the Church. Ergo, they are not competent to the civill Judge. The proposition is evident by differences betwixt Ecclesiastical persons and civill Magistrates, which might be more accurately set down by others, then by me. But they differ, 1. that the Churches power is spiritual, the Magistrates causatively, effectively or objectively spiritual, but not intrinsically and formally ⟨p. 406⟩spiritual, because he may command by the power of the sword spiritual acts of preaching, administrating the Sacraments purely, of defining necessary truths in Synods, and forbid the contrary, but he cannot formally himself exercise these acts. 2. The Church-men are members of the Church, the Magistrate as such is a politic Father and Tutor of the Church, but not formally, as he is such a member of the Church. 3. The power of the Magistrate is carnal, and corporal, and coactive upon the bodies; for which cause, Tylenus, Daneus and others say, the external man is the object of his power, the power of the Church is spiritual, not carnal, not coactive, not bounded upon the body; the Church hath neither power of heading or hanging, but only they may use the sword of the Spirit, exhortations, rebukes, censures, excommunication. 4. Edification to be procured by the Word and Sacraments and Church-censures, is the end of Church-power, but edification to be procured by the sword, is the end of the civill Magistrate. 5. The Magistrate judgeth not what is true and false to be believed simply, as teaching, instructing, and informing the conscience, but only what is true and false to be believed or professed in relation to his sword and bodily punishment, or civill rewards. 6. The Magistrates judgement is kingly, supreme, peremptory, and highest on earth, from which we are to provoke in no sort, except in appealing to God; the Churches judgement is ministerial, conditional, limited by the Word of God. 7. The Magistrates power is over all, Heathen and Christian, over men as men, and over men as Christians, and agreeth to Heathen and Christian Magistrates alike;
5. No Ecclesiasticall power, or acts formally Ecclesiasticall, are competent to one who is not an Ecclesiasticall person, or not a member of the Church, but a civill person; but a power to define in Synods, and the exercise of acts Ecclesiasticall and matters Ecclesiasticall, are due to Ecclesiasticall persons, and to the Church. Ergo, they are not competent to the civill Judge. The proposition is evident by differences betwixt Ecclesiasticall persons and civill Magistrates, which might be more accurately set downe by others, then by me. But they differ, 1. that the Churches power is spirituall, the Magistrates causatively, effectively or objectively spirituall, but not intrinsecally and formally ⟨p. 406⟩spirituall, because he may command by the power of the sword spirituall acts of preaching, administrating the Sacraments purely, of defining necessary truths in Synods, and forbid the contrary, but he cannot formally himselfe exercise these acts. 2. The Church-men are members of the Church, the Magistrate as such is a politick Father and Tutor of the Church, but not formally, as he is such a member of the Church. 3. The power of the Magistrate is carnall, and corporall, and coactive upon the bodies; for which cause, Tylenus, Daneus and others say, the externall man is the object of his power, the power of the Church is spirituall, not carnall, not coactive, not bounded upon the body; the Church hath neither power of heading or hanging, but onely they may use the sword of the Spirit, exhortations, rebukes, censures, excommunication. 4. Edification to be procured by the Word and Sacraments and Church-censures, is the end of Church-power, but edification to be procured by the sword, is the end of the civill Magistrate. 5. The Magistrate judgeth not what is true and false to be beleeved simply, as teaching, instructing, and informing the conscience, but onely what is true and false to be beleeved or professed in relation to his sword and bodily punishment, or civill rewards. 6. The Magistrates judgement is kingly, supreame, peremptory, and highest on earth, from which we are to provoke in no sort, except in appealing to God; the Churches judgement is ministeriall, conditionall, limited by the Word of God. 7. The Magistrates power is over all, Heathen and Christian, over men as men, and over men as Christians, and agreeth to Heathen and Christian Magistrates alike;