A57975:822
Lex, Rex
Lex, rex The law and the prince : a dispute for the just prerogative of king and people : containing the reasons and causes of the most necessary defensive wars of the kingdom of Scotland and of their expedition for the aid and help of their dear brethren of England : in which their innocency is asserted and a full answer is given to a seditious pamphlet entitled Sacro-sancta regum majestas, or, The sacred and royal prerogative of Christian kings, under the name of J. A. but penned by Jo. Maxwell the excommunicate P. Prelate. : with a scriptural confutation of the ruinous grounds of W. Barclay, H. Grotius, H. Arnisœus, Ant. de Domi P. Bishop of Spalata, and of other late anti-magistratical royalists, as the author of Ossorianum, D. Fern, E. Symmons, the doctors of Aberdeen, &c. : in XLIV questions.Lex, rex The law and the prince : a dispute for the just prerogative of king and people : containing the reasons and causes of the most necessary defensive wars of the kingdom of Scotland and of their expedition for the ayd and help of their dear brethren of England : in which their innocency is asserted and a full answer is given to a seditious pamphlet intituled Sacro-sancta regum majestas, or, The sacred and royall prerogative of Christian kings, under the name of J. A. but penned by Jo. Maxwell the excommunicate P. Prelat. : with a scripturall confutation of the ruinous grounds of W. Barclay, H. Grotius, H. Arnisœus, Ant. de Domi P. Bishop of Spalata, and of other late anti-magistratical royalists, as the author of Ossorianum, D. Fern, E. Symmons, the doctors of Aberdeen, &c. : in XLIV questions.
London: printed for John Field, 1644London: printed for Iohn Field, 1644
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. Assert. It is evident from Rom. 13. That all subjection and ⟨p. 266⟩obedience to higher powers commanded there is subjection to the power and office of the Magistrate in abstracto, or (which is all one) to the person using the power lawfully, and that no subjection is due by that text, or any Word of God, to the abused and Tyrannical power of the King, which I evince from the Text, and from other Scriptures. 1. Because the Text saith, Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. But no powers commanding things unlawful, and killing the innocent people of God, can be [Greek or Hebrew] higher powers, but in that lower powers. 1. He that commandeth not what God commandeth, and punisheth and killeth where God is personally and immediately present, would neither command nor punish, is not in these acts to be subjected unto, and obeyed as a superior power, though in habit he may remain a superior power, for all habitual, all actual superiority is a formal participation of the power of the most high.1 2. Arnisaeus well saith, That of Aristotle must be true, It is against nature, that better and worthier men should be in subjection to unworthier, and more wicked men: but in this when Magistrates command wickedness, and killeth the innocent, the non-obeyers eatenus in so far, are worthier the commanders (whatever they be in habit and in office) actually, or in these wicked acts are unworthier and inferior, and the non-obeyers are in that worthier, as being zealous adherents to Gods Command, and not to mans will. I desire not to be mistaken, if we speak of habitual excellency, godly and holy men as the Witnesses of Christ in things lawful, are to obey wicked and Infidel Kings and Emperors, but in that these wicked Kings have an excellency in respect of office above them;2 but when they command things unlawful, and kill the innocent, They do it not by virtue of any office, and so in that they are not higher powers, but lower and weak ones. Laertius doth explain Aristotle well, who defineth a Tyrant by this,3 That he commandeth his subjects by violence, and Arnisaeus condemneth Laertius for this, Because one Tyrannical action doth no more constitute a Tyrant, then one unjust action doth constitute an unjust man. But he may condemn (as he doth indeed) for this also Covarruvias pract. quest. c. 1. and Vasquez Illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 47. n. 1.12.