Lex, Rex

Some Royalists are so impudent, as to say that there was no violence here, and that Elisha was an extraordinary man, and that it is not lawful for us to call a King the son of a murderer, as the Prophet Elisha did: but Ferne sect. 2. pag. 9. forgetting himself, saith from hence, It is lawful to resist the Prince himself, thus far, as toward his blows, and hold his hands: But let Ferne answer, if the violent binding of the Princes hands, that he shall not be able to kill, be a greater violence done to his Royal person, then Davids cutting off the lap of Sauls garment; for certainly, the Royal body of a Prince is of more worth then his clothes. Now it was a sin, I judge, that smote Davids conscience, that he being a subject, and not in the act of natural self-defence, did cut the garment of the Lords Anointed. Let Ferne see then how he will save his own principles, for certainly he yieldeth the cause for me; I judge that the person of the King, or any Judge, who is the Lords Deputy, as is the King, is sacred, and that remaining in that honourable case, no subject can without guiltiness before God, put hands in his person, the case of natural self-defence being excepted: for because the Royal dignity doth not advance a King above the common condition of men, and the Throne maketh him not leave off to be a man, and a man that can do wrong; and therefore as one that doth manifest violence to the life of a man, though his subject, he may ⟨p. 346⟩be resisted with •od•ly […] in the case of u•j•st and violent invasion. It is a vain thing to say, Who shall be judge between the King and his subjects? The subject cannot judge the King, because none can be judge in his own cause, and an inferior or equal cannot judge a superior or equal. But I answer, 1. This is the Kings own cause also, and he doth unjust violence as a man, and not as a King, and so he cannot be judge more then the subject. 2. Every one that doth unjust violence as he is such, is inferior to the innocent, and so ought to be judged by some. 3. There is no need of the formality of a judge in things evident to natures eye, such as are manifestly unjust violences: Nature in acts natural of self-defence, is judge, party, accuser, witness, and all; for it is supposed the Judge is absent, when the Judge doth wrong. And for the plea of Elisha's extraordinary spirit;