A59693:100
Theses Sabbaticæ, or, The doctrine of the Sabbath wherein the Sabbaths I. Morality, II.…
Theses Sabbaticæ, or, The doctrine of the Sabbath wherein the Sabbaths I. Morality, II. Change, III. Beginning. IV. Sanctification, are clearly discussed, which were first handled more largely in sundry sermons in Cambridge in New-England in opening of the Fourth Commandment : in unfolding whereof many scriptures are cleared, divers cases of conscience resolved, and the moral law as a rule of life to a believer, occasionally and distinctly handled / by Thomas Shepard ...Theses Sabbaticæ, or, The doctrine of the Sabbath wherein the Sabbaths I. Morality, II. Change, III. Beginning. IV. Sanctification, are clearly discussed, which were first handled more largely in sundry sermons in Cambridge in New-England in opening of the Fourth COmmandment : in unfolding whereof many scriptures are cleared, divers cases of conscience resolved, and the morall law as a rule of life to a believer, occasionally and distinctly handled / by Thomas Shepard ...
London: printed by T.R. and E.M. for John Rothwell, 1650
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Thesis 26.
If therefore a moral law command that which is suitable to humane nature, and good in it self, then it follows from hence, (which was touched before) that divine ⟨p. 21⟩determination of something in a law, doth not alway take away morality from a law, for divine determination is many times no more but a plain and positive declaration of that which is suitable, just and good and equal for man to observe: now that which points out and declares unto us the morality of a law, cannot possibly abolish and destroy such a law. For a moral law commanding that which is suitable and good (as hath been shown) it is impossible that the Commandment which determineth and directeth to that which is good, that by this determination it should overthrow the being of such a good law, nay verily particular determination and positiveness (as some call it) is so far from abolishing, as that it rather adds to the being, as well as to the clearing up and manifestation of such a law. For if it be not sufficient to make a moral law, that the thing be good in it self, but that also it must be commanded; then the Commandment which many times only determines to that which is good (and consequently determination) doth add unto the being of a moral law.
If therefore a morall law command that which is suitable to humane nature, and good in it selfe, then it followes from hence, (which was toucht before) that divine ⟨p. 21⟩determination of something in a law, doth not alway take away morality from a law, for divine determination is many times no more but a plain and positive declaration of that which is suitable, just and good and equall for man to observe: now that which points out and declares unto us the morality of a law, cannot possibly abolish and destroy such a law. For a morall law commanding that which is suitable and good (as hath been shewne) it is impossible that the Commandment which determineth and directeth to that which is good, that by this determination it should overthrow the being of such a good law, nay verily particular determination and positivenesse (as some call it) is so farre from abolishing, as that it rather addes to the being, as well as to the clearing up and manifestation of such a law. For if it be not sufficient to make a morall law, that the thing be good in it selfe, but that also it must be commanded; then the Commandment which many times onely detemines to that which is good (and consequently determination) doth adde unto the being of a morall law.