A64002:1554
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
that is with a possibility of not coming to pass. Now the free actions of men are one sort of contingent things They therefore shall infallibly come to pass also by virtue of Gods irresistible will; but how? Not necessarily but contingently, that is with a possibility of not coming to pass in general as they are things contingent: And in special they shall come to pass not contingently only but freely also; that is with a free power in the Agents by whom they are acted to do otherwise. Yet there is another difference according to the moral condition of these actions For if they are good and so far as they are good they come to pass by Gods working of them, but if they are evil, and so far as they are evil they come to pass only by Gods permitting; according to that of Austin. Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Not any thing comes to pass, but God willing it either by suffering it (to wit in case it be evil) or himself working it (to wit in case it ⟨p. 50⟩be good.) And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Arch-Bishop, and Bishops, and the rest of the Clergy in Ireland, which is this; God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever should come to pass in time; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather. Farther consider it is confessed by all, that God concurs in producing the act of sin, as an efficient cause thereof not moral, but natural. And Aquinas himself, though he denies that, Voluntas Dei est malorum, Because indeed as Hugo de Sancto Victore observes by the will of God is commonly understood in this case Voluntas approbans; his will approving it, and loving it. And so it is justly denied that God doth will evil things, speaking of the evil of sin. Yet Aquinas professeth, and disputes and proves that Actus peccati est a Deo, the Act of sin is from God. Like as the Act of walking is from the soul, though the lameness in walking ariseth from some disease in the leg. Now the Devil concurs not in this manner to any act of sin; neither is the efficient cause thereof in the Kind of a Natural efficient, but only Moral by tempting and persuading. What therefore?
that is with a possibility of not comming to passe. Now the free actions of men are one sort of contingent things They therefore shall infallibly come to passe also by vertue of Gods irresistible will; but how? Not necessarily but contingently, that is with a possibility of not coming to passe in generall as they are things contingent: And in speciall they shall come to passe not contingently onely but freely also; that is with a free power in the Agents by whom they are acted to doe otherwise. Yet there is another difference according to the morall condition of these actions For if they are good and so farre as they are goood they come to passe by Gods working of them, but if they are evill, and so farre as they are evill they come to passe onely by Gods permitting; according to that of Austin. Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotēs fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Not any thing comes to passe, but God willing it either by suffering it (to wit in case it be evill) or himselfe working it (to wit in case it