The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

2 I come to his second reason to examine whether he carrieth himself any thing more handsomely in that. If God be the Author of sin he cannot be the punisher of sin. This argument is better shaped then the former; but forthwith he tells us that he cannot be in justice the punisher of that whereof himself is the Author. Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expressed in his argument, the one is the application of it to the same sin whereof he was the Author, which was not expressed in the Argument. And without this application the Argument is of no force. For earthly Magistrates are sinners, yet the punishers of sin in others, yea of the same kind of sin. As though a Magistrate be a profaner of the name of God, yet he may execute the law on them who do profane the name of God, and that justly. Then what is it that makes a man the Author of sin? It is well known, that though it be unlawful for a man to permit sin, if it be in his power to hinder it, yet unless God permit sin, it cannot be committed by any, Nos certe, saith Austin, si eos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare Scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus. Quam vero innumerabilia ille permitit fieri ante oculos suos, quae utique si voluisset nullâ ratione permitteret. Certainely ⟨p. 60⟩if we suffer those, over whom we have power, to commit sin, we shall be guilty together with them. But how innumerable are the sins which he suffers to be committed before his eyes, which if he would, he could hinder, so that by no means they should cone to pass. Or is he the Author of sin who is the efficient cause of the act of sin? It is Aquinas his doctrine, that, the act of sin is from God, and that in the kind of an efficient cause; and it is commonly received to be the first cause in the kind of efficients, subordinate to none, and all other subordinate to him. Nay more then this Scotus professeth, and after him the Dominicans, that, God determineth the will to every act thereof (though sinful) as touching the substance thereof, but how? Surely no otherwise then to come to pass agreeably to their nature; necessary acts necessarily, free acts freely. So Barwardine maintains that God necessitates the will of the creature; but how? To perform acts thereof freely.

2 I come to his second reason to examine whether he carryeth himselfe any thing more handsomly in that. If God be the Authour of sinne he cannot be the punisher of sin. This argument is better shaped then the former; but forthwith he tells us that he cannot be in justice the punisher of that whereof himselfe is the Authour. Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expressed in his argument, the one is the application of it to the same sinne whereof he was the Authour, which was not expressed in the Argument. And without this application the Argument is of no force. For earthly Magistrates are sinners, yet the punishers of sinne in others, yea of the same kind of sinne. As though a Magistrate be a profaner of the name of God, yet he may execute the law on them who doe profane the name of God, and that justly. Then what is it that makes a man the Author of sinne? It is well knowne, that though it be unlawfull for a man to permit sinne, if it be in his power to hinder it, yet unlesse God permit sinne, it cannot be committed by any, Nos certe, saith Austin, sieos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare Scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus. Quam vero innumerabilia ille permitit fieri ante oculos suos, quae utique si voluisset nullâ ratione permitteret. Certainely