A64002:1574
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
So I will imagine that he speaks of Reprobation, which is the will of God, not as touching the act of God Reprobating & making such a decree, but as touching the thing decreed, & this thing decreed he will have to be of an avoidable nature. Now this we willingly grant, & utterly deny, that this any way hinders the absoluteness of God's decree. We say with the 11 article of the Church of Ireland, that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsel ordain whatsoever should in time come to pass, yet so as hereby neither the contingency nor liberty of the second causes is taken away, but established rather. So that whereas we see some things come to pass necessarily, some contingently; so God hath ordained that all things shall come to pass that do come to pass; but necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, that is, avoidably & with a possibility of not coming to pass. For every University Scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency, yet will not I content my self with the article of Ireland, for this Aquinas thus distinguisheth. For 1having proposed this question, Whether the will of God doth impose a necessity upon the things willed. To this question this Author with whom I deal would answer affirmatively, saying, it doth impose a necessity on all such things, or at least obtrude such an opinion upon us; & himself undoubtedly thinks that in case Gods will be absolute it must cause a necessity upon all things willed thereby, both which are utterly untrue, & this last utterly denied by Aquinas. For first, every will of God is absolute in the judgment of Aquinas, which I prove ⟨p. 64⟩thus; That will which hath no cause or reason thereof is absolute: This proposition I presume this Author will not deny: But the will of God hath no cause in the judgment of Aquinas therefore every will of God is absolute by his doctrine: Yet this absolute will of God imposeth not a necessity upon all things willed by him, but only on some things. 2Divina volunt as non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit. And in the body of that question thus he writes, The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the 3distinction of God's will. For when a cause is effectual and powerful to work, the effect followeth the cause, not only so far as to be brought to pass, but also as touching the manner of its coming to pass.