The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

Only here is the difference, the Physician may be a culpable cause, as who is bound to love his neighbour as himself; but God being bound to none, is no culpable cause of man's continuance in sin, and in the hardness of his heart, albeit he can cure him, but will not. As for Piscator's saying here mentioned, Reprobates are appointed precisely to this double evil, to be punished everlastingly, and to sin; and therefore to sin that they may be justly punished. Herring are two things charged upon Piscator. 1. That Reprobates are precisely appointed by God to perish everlastingly. To this I answer that no Arminian that I know denies Reprobates to be appoinby God to everlasting damnation. All the question is about the manner of appointing them; namely whether this appointment of God, proceeds merely according to his mere pleasure, or upon the foresight of sin. We say it proceeds merely according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon the foresight of sin preceding. And this we not only say, but prove thus. If reprobation proceed upon the foresight of sin, then it were of men's evil works. Now look upon what grounds the Apostle proves, that election is not of; good works, upon the same ground it is evident that reprobation is not of evil works: for the argument for the one is this. Before Jacob & Esau were borne or had done good or evil; it was said to Rebekah the elder shall serve the younger, therefore election is not of good works. In like manner thus I reason concerning Reprobation, Before Jacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evil it was said to Rebekah, the elder shall serve the younger, therefore reprobation is not of evil works. 2. If God doth ordain any man to damnation upon foresight of sin, then this sin foreseen is the cause of the Divine ordinance; but sin foreseen cannot be the cause why God ordained man to damnation; as I prove thus. If it be the cause then either by the necessity of nature; or by the ordinance of God; not by necessity of nature. For undoubtedly God if it pleased him could ordain to annihilate them for their sins, instead of punishing them with eternal fire. Nor can it be the cause of any such decree by the free ordinance of God.

Only here is the difference, the Physitian may be a culpable cause, as who is bound to love his neighbour as himselfe; but God being bound to none, is no culpable cause of man's continuance in sinne, and in the hardnesse of his heart, albeit he can cure him, but will not. As for Piscator's saying here mentioned, Reprobates are appointed precisely to this double evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne; and therefore to sinne that they may be justly punished. Hereing are two things charged upon Piscator. 1. That Reprobates are precisely appointed by God to perish everlastingly. To this I answer that noe Arminiā that I know denies Reprobates to be appoinby God to everlasting damnation. All the question is about the manner of appointing them; namely whether this appointment of God, proceeds meerly according to his meer pleasure, or upon the foresight of sinne. We say it proceeds meerly according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon the foresight of sinne preceding. And this we not only say, but prove thus. If reprobation proceed upon the foresight of sinne, then it were of men's evill workes. Now looke upon what grounds the Apostle proves, that election is not of; good workes, upon the same ground it is evident that reprobation is not of evill works: for the argumēt for the one is this. Before Iacob & Esau were borne or had done good or evill; it was said to Rebekah the elder shall serve the younger, therfore election is not of good works. In like manner thus I reason concerning Reprobation, Before Iacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evill it was said to Rebekah, the elder shall serve the younger, therefore reprobation is not of evill workes. 2. If God doth ordaine any man to damnation upon foresight of sin, then this sin foreseen is the cause of the Divine ordinance; but sin foreseen cannot be the cause why God ordained man to damnation; as I prove thus. If it be the cause then either by the necessity of nature; or by the ordinance of God; not by necessity of nature. For undoubtedly God if it pleased him could ordaine to annihilate them for their sinnes, instead of punishing them with eternall fire. Nor can it be the cause of any such decree by the free ordinance of God.