The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

James speaketh, there is no variableness, nor shadow of change. He doth acknowledge, we maintain, potentiam in se liberam; but then he saith, we do not maintain, liberum usum; a most absurd distinction. For no power deserves to be styled free, save that it is of free use and exercise. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirm, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cause that this or that shall be done by a reasonable creature freely: this is it that Bradwardine proposeth to the judgment of all to consider, whether it be not an unreasonable thing to deny this unto God. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it self, and maketh them do those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor necessitating (as I said before) are the expressions of our Divines, but of Papists; yet he lays not this to the charge of Papist's: Noah nor to the charge of Bellarmine, for saying that God doth not only rule, and govern, but wrest and bend them, and that to one evil rather then to an other. If Scholars of our Universities use any such phrases, it is no other then they find in use among School-divines. It is true indeed Jesuits oppose the Dominicans in this. This Author sides with the Jesuits, but why doth he not take to task any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to answer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other then the very word of God, and clear reason doth justify. And the ground of the Jesuits in opposing, is merely an invention of their own, concerning a certain knowledge of God called a middle knowledge; a vile invention, and a palpable untruth, and controllable of manifest contradiction. For they suppose a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future, being in it's own nature merely possible; and consequently cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible, into the ⟨p. 78⟩condition of a thing future without a cause. Now no cause can be devised hereof with any colour of reason, but the will of God. For first, the cause hereof must be eternal, seeing the thing it self, of the cause whereof we dispute, is eternal to wit, the fruition of any thing.

Iames speaketh, there is no variablenesse, nor shadow of change. He doth acknowledge, we maintaine, potentiam in se liberam; but then he saith, we doe not maintaine, liberum usum; a most absurd distinction. For noe power deserves to be stiled free, save that it is of free use and exercise. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirme, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cause that this or that shall be done by a reasonable creature freely: this is it that Bradwardine proposeth to the judgment of all to consider, whether it be not an unreasonable thing to deny this unto God. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe, and maketh them doe those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor necessitating (as I said before) are the expressions of our Divines, but of Papists; yet he laies not this to the charge of Papist's: Noe nor to the charge of Bellarmine, for saying that God doth not only rule, and governe, but wrest and bend them, and that to one evill rather then to an other. If Scholars of our Universities use any such phrases, it is no other then they find in use among School-divines. It is true indeed Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this. This Authour sides with the Jesuites, but why doth he not take to taske any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to answer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other then the very word of God, and cleare reason doth justifie. And the ground of the Jesuites in opposing, is meerely an invention of their own, concerning a certaine knowledge of God called a middle knowledge; a vile invention, and a palpable untruth, and controulable of manifest contradiction. For they suppose a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future, being in it's own nature meerly possible; and consequently cannot passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible, into the