The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

For first, like as upon this doctrine, that, Grace is not given according unto works, the absoluteness of predestination is grounded in the judgment of Austin as by necessary consequence issuing there from: In like sort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's works, as necessarily followeth the absoluteness of Reprobation. Secondly, look by what reason the Apostle proves, that Election is not of good works, namely because, before the children were borne or had done any good, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger; by the same reason it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evil works, because, before they were borne or had done good or evil, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger, Esau's reprobation being as emphatically signified under his subjection to Jacob his younger, as Jacob's election was designed by his dominion over Esau his Elder brother. 3. If sin be the cause of the decree of Reprobation, then either of 'its own nature, or by constitution divine. Not by necessity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for sin, had it pleased him. If by constitution Divine, mark what absurdity followeth, namely this, that, God did ordain that upon foresight of sin, he would ordain men unto damnation. 4. If foresight of sin precedes the decree of damning them for sin, then the decree to permit sin much more precedes the decree to damn them for it, as without which there can be no foresight of sin; and consequently permission of sin is first in intention, and then damnation; and therefore it should be last in execution; that is, men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to sin, to wit, in an other world. 5. And lastly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be no cause of God's will, as Aquinas hath proved; much less can a temporal thing be the cause of God's will, which is eternal. Upon this ground it is that Aquinas professeth, Never any man was so mad, as to say that any thing might be the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So may I say, it were a mad thing to maintain that any thing can be the cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the case is altogether alike;

For first, like as upon this doctrine, that, Grace is not given according unto workes, the absolutenesse of predestination is grounded in the judgment of Austine as by necessary consequence issuing there from: In like sort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's workes, as necessarily followeth the absolutenesse of Reprobation. Secondly, looke by what reason the Apostle proves, that Election is not of good workes, namely because, before the children were borne or had done any good, it was said the Elder shall serve the Yonger; by the same reason it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evill workes, because, before they were borne or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger, Esau's reprobation being as emphatically signified under his subjection to Iacob his younger, as Iacob's election was designed by his dominion over Esau his Elder brother. 3. If sinne be the cause of the decree of Reprobation, then either of 'its own nature, or by constitution divine. Not by necessity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for sinne, had it pleased him. If by constitution Divine, mark what absurdity followeth, namely this, that, God did ordaine that upon foresight of sinne, he would ordaine men unto damnation. 4. If foresight of sinne precedes the decree of damning them for sin, then the decree to permit sin much more precedes the decree to damne them for it, as without which there can be noe foresight of sin; and consequently permission of sin is first in intention, and then damnation; and therefore it should be last in execution; that is, men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to sin, to wit, in an other world. 5. And lastly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be noe cause of God's will, as Aquinas hath proved; much lesse can a temporall thing be the cause of God's will, which is eternall. Upon this ground it is that Aquinas professeth, Never any man was so mad, as to say that any thing might be the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So may I say, it were a mad thing to maintaine that any thing can be the cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the case is altogether alike;