The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

Yet it breaks forth more then he could wish, in setting down the end why God permits sin, to wit, because men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to work their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to do what they will; if they will sin to permit them; if they would do any good work whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good work, or to abstain from sin, to permit that also; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath no more hand in working a man to any good work (excepting the act of commanding and persuading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evil. For because they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themselves, and permit them to do what they will, whether it be good or evil: otherwise God should nullify his own institution in making them free Agents. Yet consider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own side, both Arminians and Jesuits. For Arminius maintains that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of sin without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like do the Jesuits maintain in their doctrine of grace effectual in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good work, and accordingly preserve him from any sin by virtue of grace effectual, which is shaped by them in such a manner, as to be no way prejudicial to the liberty of their wills. But Tertullians authority hath abused his fancy, and exposed him to lay open himself in so shameful a manner. Yet Tertullian will not serve his turn any more, then it doth serve Arminius his turn, as I have showed in my answer to Arminius lib. 1. part. prima de praedest. Sect: 7, and that at large. Secondly, the reasons he brings for the contradistinction of decree permissive, from decree operative, are very vain. For 1, the decree operative is extrinsical to the sinner, as well as the decree permissive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the sin (as which admits no efficient cause thereof being of a mere privative nature) but upon the substance of the act, which I presume this Author will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permissive is not an antecedent only, but such as being put, sin follows of necessity, as well as upon the position of the decree operative;

Yet it breakes forth more then he could wish, in setting down the end why God permits sinne, to wit, because men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to worke their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to doe what they will; if they will sinne to permit them; if they would doe any good worke whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good worke, or to abstaine from sinne, to permit that also; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath noe more hand in working a man to any good worke (excepting the act of commanding and perswading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evill. For because they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themselves, and permit them to doe what they will, whether it be good or evill: otherwise God should nullifie his own institution in making them free Agents. Yet consider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own side, both Arminians and Iesuites. For Arminius maintaines that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of sinne without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like doe the Iesuites maintaine in their doctrine of grace effectuall in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good worke, and accordingly preserve him from any sinne by vertue of grace effectuall, which is shaped by them in such a manner, as to be noe way prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills. But Tertullians authority hath abused his fancy, and exposed him to lay open himselfe in so shamefull a manner. Yet Tertullian will not serve his turn any more, then it doth serve Arminius his turne, as I have shewed in my answer to Arminius lib. 1. part. prima de praedest. Sect: 7, and that at large. Secondly, the reasons he brings for the contradistinction of decree permissive, from decree operative, are very vaine. For 1, the decree operative is extrinsecall to the sinner, as well as the decree permissive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the sinne (as which admits noe efficient cause thereof being of a mere privative nature) but upon the substance of the act, which I presume this Authour will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permissive is not an antecedent only, but such as being put, sinne followes of necessitie, as well as upon the position of the decree operative;