A64002:1695
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cause thereof. In this conclusion the Divines on both sides do concur. 2. Free will created in the actual use of Dominion and power which she hath over her acts, depends on God as of an absolute Lord, predeliberating, and predetermining before the foreknowledge of the creatures future cooperation what the free will, will do in particular. This conclusion is held of all those Divines who maintain that God by his motion or effectual grace, not only morally, but efficiently and physically doth cause us to work that which is good, & it is proved, saith he by all those reasons whereby it hath been formerly showed that God by his decree & effectual motion doth predetermine all second causes, even such as are free, to work, preserving their liberty and nature 3. The dominion of her act is not first in the power of free will created, but in the power and dominion of God, especially in respect of acts supernatural Our meaning is that all dominion & actual use of dominion which the created will hath as causa proxima the next cause, or doth exercise over her free acts which she produceth, proceedeth from God, as from the chiefest & first cause efficient, & ought to be resolved into him as into the first Author & first absolute Lord thereof And the truth is the question of free will, is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous distinction. For as for free will unto good that is merely Moral, and the resolution thereof, is according to the resolution in the point of original sin. But free will unto actions in general under an appearance of good, this is natural liberty; and the resolution thereof depends upon a right understanding of God's natural providence in governing the world, and working with all creatures in their several kinds, such operations as are agreeable to their several conditions. The first liberty consists in disposing man aright towards his end; like as moral virtues tend to this. But the second liberty consist's only in the right use of the means, unto what end soever is projected by us. The appearance of good moving herein is only, in genere boni conducentis, in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded; whether that end can be good or evil, right or wrong.
1. The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cause thereof. In this conclusion the Divines on both sides doe concurre. 2. Free will created in the actuall use of Dominion and power which she hath over her acts, depends on God as of an absolute Lord, predeliberating, and predetermining before the foreknowledge of the creatures future cooperation what the free will, will doe in particular. This conclusion is held of all those Divines who maintaine that God by his motion or effectuall grace, not only morally, but efficiently and physically doth cause us to worke that which is good, & it is proved, saith he by all those reasons whereby it hath been formery shewed that God by his decree & effectuall motion doth predetermine all second causes, even such as are free, to worke, preserving their liberty and nature 3. The dominion of her act is not first in the power of free will created, but in the power and dominion of God, especially in respect of acts supernaturall Our meaning is that all dominion & actuall use of dominion which the created will hath as causa proxima the next cause, or doth exercise over her free acts which she produceth, proceedeth from God, as from the cheifest & first cause efficient, & ought to be resolved into him as into the first Authour & first absolute Lord thereof And the truth is the question of free will, is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous distincion. For as for free will unto good that is merely Morall, and the resolution thereof, is according to the resolution in the point of originall sinne. But free will unto actions in generall under an appearance of good, this is naturall liberty; and the resolution thereof depends upon a right understanding of God's naturall providence in governing the world, and working with all creatures in their severall kinds, such operations as are agreable to their severall conditiōs. The first liberty consists in disposing man aright towards his end; like as morall vertues tend to this. But the second liberty consist's only in the right use of the meanes, unto what end soever is projected by us. The appearance of good moving herein is only, in genere boni conducentis, in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded; whether that end can be good or evill, right or wrong.