The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

speaking of the evil of punishment, though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men; that the Lord caused the King of Assur to fall by the sword in his own land, though this was done by the hands of his own children. And as in violent courses, so in impure courses the Scripture as plainly testifies the secret providence of God to have place therein. And what doth Austin observe from the like places both in his fifth book against Julian the Pelag: c: 3, and in his book de gratia & libero arbitrio, professing, occulto Dei judicio fieri perversitatem cordis, that the perversity of the heart, or will, comes to pass by the secret judgment of God; And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evil; that is his phrase as I have formerly showed, abundantly representing the places where he delivers this. He proceeds not so much in Scholastical discourse, as in rhetorical amplification, more like a Shrew vexing him self and fretting that he cannot have his will, then like a disputer. That which necessitates the will makes it become but a servile instrument, irresistibly subject to superior command and determination; this action of command comes in most unseasonably, it denoting a moral action, commanding not only things agreeable, but sometimes contrary to the will of the person commanded. No such thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man (did he move it unto sin which yet is most false; for he moves it only to the substance of the act.) But why should it seem strange that the creature should be a Servant to the Creator, and his instrument, and a servile instrument. Yet the notion of servility is very alien from the matter in hand, that having place only in proper speech as touching moral obedience; that which we treat of, is rather of motions natural, and of the subordination of the second cause to the first, the second Agent to the first. And was ever any sober man known to oppose this with such froth of words as this Author doth? Doth this Author himself think it possible that the Creature can move it self, or perform any operation without God's concourse? I do not think he doth. Do we not live in God, have we not our being in God? And what is this other then to say that our life and being depend on God, in the kind of a cause efficient?

speaking of the evill of punishment, though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men; that the Lord caused the King of Assur to fall by the sword in his own land, though this was done by the hands of his own children. And as in violent courses, so in impure courses the Scripture as plainly testifies the secret providence of God to have place therein. And what doth Austin observe from the like places both in his fift book against Iulian the Pelag: c: 3, and in his book de gratia & libero arbitrio, professing, occulto Dei judicio fieri perversitatem cordis, that the perversity of the heart, or will, comes to passe by the secret judgment of God; And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evill; that is his phrase as I have formerly shewed, abundantly representing the places where he delivers this. He proceeds not so much in Scholasticall discourse, as in rhetoricall amplification, more like a Shrew vexing him selfe and fretting that he cannot have his will, then like a disputer. That which necessitates the will makes it become but a servile instrument, irresistably subject to superiour command and determination; this action of command comes in most unseasonably, it denoting a morall action, commanding not only things agreable, but sometimes contrary to the will of the person commanded. No such thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man (did he move it unto sinne which yet is most false; for he moves it only to the substance of the act.) But why should it seeme strange that the creature should be a Servant to the Creator, and his instrument, and a servile instrument. Yet the notion of servility is very aliene from the matter in hand, that having place only in proper speech as touching morall obedience; that which we treat of, is rather of motions naturall, and of the subordination of the second cause to the first, the second Agent to the first. And was ever any sober man known to oppose this with such froth of words as this Authour doth? Doth this Authour himselfe thinke it possible that the Creature can move it selfe, or performe any operation without God's concourse? I doe not think he doth. Doe we not live in God, have we not our being in God? And what is this other then to say that our life and being depend on God, in the kind of a cause efficient?