The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

And doth not the same Apostle, and in the same place testify, and that in the words of an heathen man (to show that all such did not so maintain the [Greek or Hebrew], the [Greek or Hebrew], the [Greek or Hebrew] condition of the will, as to maintain the exemption of it from influence Divine) profess that in God we move also? And the truth is all the question is about the manner of this concourse divine; whereabouts this Author spends not a word, as if he kept his breath for some other purpose then to deal on that point, which alone is controverted. The irresistible subjection he speaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty, which is most untrue For proof whereof I appeal to every man that will but look upon Alvarez, that maintains this divine motion of will under the notion of determining; And upon Bradwardine, who alone, that I know maintains the same divine motion under the notion of necessitating: Whereas he infers herehence that God is a truer cause of all such acts and sins that proceed from the will so determined, then the will is. Oftentimes he hath set before us such Coleworts; but we have nothing but his bare word for it. And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free. Whereas both Bradwardin maintains that God necessitates the creature to every free act of his; And Alvarez, that God determines the creature to work freely. Now is it a sober course hence to infer, that the act is not free? As much as to say it cannot but be free, therefore it is not free. And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to sin, and in the best of God's children there is a principle that inclines to sin. God is confessed by our very opposites to be the true cause of the act; yet not at all the cause of the sin by his concourse. Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourse; We say God concurs to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only, but the first Agent; not a cause only, but the first cause; and man as a second Agent, and second cause that moveth in God as the Apostle testifies; like as he lives in God, and hath his being in God. But these men devise God, and man to move to the producing of the same act, as two men in lifting ⟨p. 108⟩a timber log, most indecently:

And doth not the same Apostle, and in the same place testifie, and that in the words of an heathen man (to shew that all such did not so maintaine the 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, the , the condition of the will, as to maintaine the exemption of it from influence Divine) professe that in God we move also? And the truth is all the question is about the manner of this concourse divine; whereabouts this Authour spends not a word, as if he kept his breath for some other purpose then to deale on that point, which alone is controverted. The irresistable subjection he speaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty, which is most untrue For proof whereof I appeale to every man that will but look upon Alvarez, that maintaines this divine motion of will under the notion of determining; And upon Bradwardine, who alone, that I know maintaines the same divine motion under the notion of necessitating: Whereas he infers herehence that God is a truer cause of all such acts and sins that proceed from the will so determined, then the will is. Oftentimes he hath set before us such Coleworts; but we have nothing but his bare word for it. And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free. Whereas both Bradwardin maintaines that God necessitates the creature to every free act of his; And Alvarez, that God determines the creature to worke freely. Now is it a sober course hence to inferre, that the act is not free? As much as to say it cannot but be free, therfore it is not free. And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to sinne, and in the best of God's children there is a principle that inclines to sinne. God is confessed by our very opposites to be the true cause of the act; yet not at all the cause of the sin by his concourse. Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourse; We say God concurres to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only, but the first Agent; not a cause only, but the first cause; and man as a second Agent, and second cause that moveth in God as the Apostle testifies; like as he lives in God, and hath his being in God. But these men devise God, and man to move to the producing of the same act, as two men in lifting