A64002:1701
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And to free this concurrence from chance, they say sometimes that God works this or that act in us modo velimus, that is, upon condition that we will But when they consider that God works the act of willing, as well as ought else; & are demanded to answer upon what condition he works this what condition will they devise of this? will he say; modo velimus, provided that we will? As much as to say, God will produce the act of willing, provided that it be produced already by us. Others say that God foreseeing that the will of man, at such a time will produce such an act of willing in case God be pleased to concur to the producing of it, hereupon he resolves to concur to the producing of it, whereby the final resolution is rather into the will of God, then into the will of the creature, I say the final resolution of every sinful act committed by the creature. Secondly here is devised a thing future without all ground. For whereas the act of willing (as for example in Judas, the act of willing to betray his Master, is it in 'its own nature merely possible not future how then did it pass into the condition of a thing future and that from everlasting (For from everlasting God knew it as a thing future) this could not be done without a cause? And what cause could there be of an eternal effect, but an eternal cause which is God alone: And in God nothing can be devised to be the cause thereof, but his will or decree. Therefore to avoid this they must be driven to conclude that all future things became future by necessity of nature; if not of their own nature; yet at least by the necessity of God's nature, he producing them all not freely, but by necessity of nature This is that Atheistical necessity whereupon our Adversaries are cast, while they oppose such a necessity as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to pass agreeably to their natures, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining necessary causes working necessarily, for the producing of the one; and contingent causes working contingently, for the producing of the other; as Aquinas discourseth. 1. pag q. 19, in the Article whose title is this, Utrum divina voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat, whether the will of God imposeth a necessity on things that come to pass in the world?
And to free this concurrence from chance, they say sometimes that God workes this or that act in us modo velimus, that is, upon condition that we will But when they consider that God workes the act of willing, as well as ought else; & are demanded to answer upon what condition he workes this what condition will they devise of this? will he say; modo velimus, provided that we will? As much as to say, God will produce the act of willing, provided that it be produced already by us. Others say that God foreseeing that the will of man, at such a time will produce such an act of willing in case God be pleased to concurre to the producing of it, hereupon he resolves to concurre to the producing of it, whereby the finall resolution is rather into the will of God, then into the will of the creature, I say the finall resolution of every sinfull act committed by the creature. Secondly here is devised a thing future without all ground. For whereas the act of willing (as for example in Iudas, the act of willing to betray his Master, is it in 'its own nature merely possible not future how then did it passe into the condition of a thing future and that from everlasting (For from everlasting God knew it as a thing future) this could not be done without a cause? And what cause could there be of an eternall effect, but an eternall cause which is God alone: And in God nothing can be devised to be the cause thereof, but his will or decree. Therefore to avoid this they must be driven to conclude that all future things became future by necessitie of nature; if not of their own nature; yet at least by the necessitie of God's nature, he producing them all not freely, but by necessitie of nature This is that Atheisticall necessitie whereupon our Adversaries are cast, while they oppose such a necessitie as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to passe agreably to their natures, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining necessary causes working necessarily, for the producing of the one; and contingent causes working contingently, for the producing of the other; as Aquinas discourseth. 1. pag q. 19, in the Article whose title is this, Utrum divina voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat, whether the will of God imposeth a necessitie on things that come to passe in the world?