The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

The reason this Author brings is a mere Socysme, saying the same over and over again; As when he saith, For when two causes concur to the producing of an effect; the one principal overruling cause, the other but an instrumental & wholly at the devotion of the principal, then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principal, which by the force of 'its influx and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumental, which is but a mere servant in the production of it. To which I answer, that which he calls overruling, I have often showed how absurdly it is imputed unto us. For how can that be called overruling which works not the will contrary to 'its nature, but moves it only agreeably to the nature thereof. As for the cause principal, what Scholar of any brains ever denied God to be the cause principal in any action to the producing whereof he concurs? For is he not the first cause and the first Agent? Are not all other second causes and second Agents? But this Author hopes his Reader will understand this in reference only to the sin, not to the natural act under it, whereas God as touching the sinfulness of it is no Agent at all, much less a prime Agent; no cause at all, much less a prime cause. Then secondly let God never so effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connatural thereunto, yet if he works the creature thereunto agreeably to its nature, that is if it be an necessary Agent, moves it to work necessarily, if it be a contingent agent, moves it to work contingently; if it be a free agent, moves it to work freely; then by Arminius his confession our cause is gained. For God shall be found free from blame, and the creature void of excuse. Now this is clearly our doctrine, and in effect the doctrine of all them, who say that God determines the will, as the Dominicans; or that God necessitates the will, as Bradwardine. For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to work freely, in such sort that in the very act of working they might do otherwise if they would. They confess this providence of God is a great mystery and not sufficiently comprehensible by humane reason. Cajetan professeth thus much as before alleged, and Alvarez maintains it in a set disputation;

The reason this Authour brings is a mere Socysme, saying the same over and over againe; As when he saith, For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect; the one principall overruling cause, the other but an instrumentall & wholly at the devotion of the principall, then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influxe and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall, which is but a mere servant in the production of it. To which I answer, that which he calls overruling, I have often shewed how absurdly it is imputed unto us. For how can that be called overruling which workes not the will contrary to 'its nature, but moves it only agreably to the nature thereof. As for the cause principall, what Scholar of any braines ever denyed God to be the cause principall in any action to the producing whereof he concurres? For is he not the first cause and the first Agent? Are not all other second causes and second Agents? But this Authour hopes his Reader will understand this in reference only to the sinne, not to the naturall act under it, whereas God as touching the sinfullnesse of it is no Agent at all, much lesse a prime Agent; no cause at all, much lesse a prime cause. Then secondly let God never so effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connaturall thereunto, yet if he works the creature therunto agreably to its nature, that is if it be an necessary Agent, moues it to worke necessarily, if it be a contingent agent, moves it to worke contingently; if it be a free agent, moves it to worke freely; then by Arminius his confesion our cause is gained. For God shall be found free from blame, and the creature void of excuse. Now this is clearly our doctrine, and in effect the doctrine of all them, who say that God determines the will, as the Dominicans; or that God necessitates the will, as Bradwardine. For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to worke freely, in such sort that in the very act of working they might doe otherwise if they would. They confesse this providence of God is a great mystery and not sufficiently comprehensible by humane reason. Cajetan professeth thus much as before alleadged, and Alvarez maintaines it in a set disputation;