A64002:1752
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But if we speak of such necessity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by causes intermediate; it is to be said that all things do not come to pass of necessity; but some do, and some do not. God will have some things come to pass by the mediation of causes necessary, & those come to pass necessarily; Others come to pass by the mediation of causes contingent, and those come to pass contingently; Whereby, saith he, 'tis manifest that they say not well, who say that all things come to pass of necessity in reference to the Divine will; because, as hath been showed, in respect of the Divine will, all things come to pass freely; and therefore speaking absolutely, they may not come to pass, although, upon supposition that they are willed, they cannot but come to pass; but this is only necessity upon supposition.
But if we speake of such necessity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by causes intermediate; it is to be said that all things doe not come to passe of necessity; but some doe, and some doe not. God will have some things come to passe by the mediation of causes necessary, & those come to passe necessarily; Others come to passe by the mediation of causes contingent, and those come to passe contingently; Whereby, saith he, 'tis manifest that they say not well, who say that all things come to passe of necessity in reference to the Divine will; because, as hath been shewed, in respect of the Divine will, all things come to passe freely; and therefore speaking absolutely, they may not come to passe, although, upon supposition that they are willed, they cannot but come to passe; but this is only necessity upon supposition.
1. Indeed if men did sin against their wills; and virgins sometimes are ravished, & men are slain by force full sore against their wills, they deserved no punishment. But is it possible that a man can will that which is evil against his will? Every ordinary Scholar in the University knows that axiome, Voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced. Lipsius his speech, fatally culpae fatalis poena, fatal faults have fatal punishments, this Author saith, is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason. As if he would teach the very maintainers of fate, yea the very first to understand themselves. For fate wherewith our doctrine is charged by our opposites is commonly called Fate Stoical. Now Zeno was the father of the Stoics; yet when his servant was taken playing the thief, pleaded for himself, saying it was my destiny to steal. Zeno answered him in his own language, that it was his destiny to smart for it too; right in this same sense that Lipsius spake. Yet Zeno knew full well that he punished his servant freely. And Zeno is well known to have been a great Master of morality for all this, which could not consist with denying the liberty of man's will, as this Author well knows. And Austin censureth those who feared to subject the will to all manner of necessity, as men transported with vain and causeless fears; manifesting thereby that some necessity may very well consist with a man's liberty. Magistrates though they believe with Austin that, Not any thing comes