IT is indeed the judgement of some Learned men, that the purpose or intent of God to permit, or suffer such, or such a thing to be done, or such 1or such an accident to come to pass, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogistical or consequential necessity) of the coming of it to pass. But that the truth lieth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration. If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth, to permit to come to pass in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to pass, then all things possible to be, (or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be) must be, yea, and this necessarily. For (doubtless God hath decreed, and intendeth, to leave natural causes, generally, to their natural and proper operations, and productions; yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, then ever they will do, or shall do. For example; God intendeth, and hath decreed, to permit, that fire shall burn, what combustible matter soever it shall take hold of, or that shall be cast into it, that one spark of it falling into a barrel of dried Gunpowder, should suddenly fire it, &c. But it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the world, shall be burnt with fire; or that every barrel of dry Gun-powder shall be blown up with sparks of fire falling into them. So (in the instance formerly mentioned) God had decreed to permit the Lords of Keilah to deliver up David into Sauls hand, in case he had stayed in their City, till Sauls coming to demand him: this is evident from 2the Text. But it did not follow from this permissive decree of God, that therefore these Lords must necessarily deliver up David into Sauls hand: for we know they did it not. So likewise, God hath decreed to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I mean, in respect of a natural power to do the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murder, or destroy the life of his Brother, that cometh in his way. So that evident it is, that no decree of God whatsoever, which is simply and purely permissive, doth import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to pass, of the thing so decreed.
IT is indeed the judgement of some Learned men, that the purpose or intent of God to permit, or suffer such, or such a thing to be done, or such 1or such an accident to come to passe, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogisticall or consequentiall necessity) of the coming of it to passe. But that the truth lieth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration. If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth, to permit to come to passe in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, should by vertue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to passe, then all things possible to be, (or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be) must be, yea, and this necessarily. For (doubtlesse God hath decreed, and intendeth, to leave naturall causes, generally, to their naturall and proper operations, and productions; yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, then ever they will doe, or shall doe. For example; God intendeth, and hath decreed, to permit, that fire shall burne, what combustible matter soever it shall take hold of, or that shall be cast into it, that one sparke of it falling into a barrell of dried Gunpowder, should suddainly fire it, &c. But it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the world, shall be burnt with fire; or that every barrell of dry Gun-powder shall be blown up with sparkes of fire falling into them. So (in the instance formerly mentioned) God had decreed to permit the Lords of Keilah to deliver up David into Sauls hand, in case he had stayed in their Citty, till Sauls coming to demand him: this is evident from 2the Text. But it did not follow from this permissive decree of God, that therefore these Lords must necessarily deliuer up David into Sauls hand: for we know they did it not. So likewise, God hath decreed to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I meane, in respect of a naturall power to doe the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murther, or destroy the life of his Brother, that cometh in his way. So that evident it is, that no decree of God whatsoeuer, which is simply and purely permissive, doth import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to passe, of the thing so decreed.
- 1Dr Twice.Dr Twisse.
- 21 Sam. 23. 12.
