A64002:2174
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And thus have I done with your conclusion, which I affirm not to be opposite unto any proposition in D. Twice his Books, and I hope you will pardon me, if I presume so far, as to challenge you to prove the contrary.
And thus have I done with your conclusion, which I affirme not to be opposite unto any proposition in D. Twisse his Bookes, and I hope you will pardon me, if I presume so farre, as to challenge you to prove the contrary.
In the next place, I shall make bold, to question the truth of the consequence of your Major proposition, which is this, If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass, in any case, upon any terms, or any supposition whatsoever, should by virtue of such an intention or decree ⟨p. 213⟩necessarily come to pass, then all things possible to be, &c. must be, yea, and this necessarily. And the reason why I question it, is because I much doubt, whether God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to pass conditionally, in some case, upon some terms, or upon some supposition or other, all things whatsoever, that are possible, all things (I say) that are possible, (whether unto all natural or necessary, or else all free and rational agents) that is not only such as do exist, have existed, or shall exist for the future, but also all that are in any possibility of existence, whose existence implieth no contradiction.
In the next place, I shall make bold, to question the truth of the consequence of your Major proposition, which is this, If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to passe, in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, should by vertue of such an intention or deeree ⟨p. 213⟩necessarily come to passe, then all things possible to be, &c. must be, yea, and this necessarily. And the reason why I question it, is because I much doubt, whether God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to passe conditionally, in some case, upon some termes, or upon some supposition or other, all things whatsoever, that are possible, all things (I say) that are possible, (whether unto all naturall or necessary, or else all free and rationall agents) that is not only such as doe exist, have existed, or shall exist for the future, but also all that are in any possibility of existence, whose existence implyeth no contradiction.