The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes Gods decree of damnation, he premiseth thereunto, the foresight of final impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is Moulin sound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concur with him, we should nothing trouble our selves to take him off from his concurrence with Moulin in that particular of reprobation. And we of the first way are willing to profess, that God neither damns nor decrees to damn any man, but for sin and final perseverance therein; nor so only, but in plain terms to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth Gods intention of damnation precede the consideration of sin, and final impenitency; though we do not make the consideration of sin to precede the intention of damnation, as Moulin doth. And to my understanding, other reasons there are, which cast Divines upon the third way, then the declining of these absurdities mentioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of justice, do presuppose sin. And whereas Arminius in his conference with Junius, produceth five reasons against the first way, no less then four of them proceed on this manner; The first thus, Praedestinatio est voluntas Dei de illustrandâ suâ gloriâ per misericordiā & justitiā: At illa voluntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo. The third thus, Praedestinatio est pars providentiae administrantis & gubernantis humanū genus; ergò posterior naturâ actu creationis vel proposito creandi. Si posterior actu creationis vel propositio creandi hominē, jam homo praedestinationis objectum non est consideratus, ut nondū conditus. His 4th argument is this, Predestinatio est praeparatio supernaturalium bonorū; ergo praecedit communicatio naturaliū, & proptereà creatio in naturâ sive actu, sive in decreto Dei. His last reason is of the same nature thus, Illustratio sapientiae Dei per creationē prior est illustratione sapientiae Dei quae est administratio praedestinationis, 1 Cor. 1. 21. Ergo creatio prior est praedestinatione. To all which reasons of his, I have answered in my Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib. 1. part. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. in several chapters. Only the second argument of Arminius insisteth upon Gods ordination of mans fall.

it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes Gods decree of damnation, he premiseth thereunto, the foresight of finall impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is Moulin sound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concurre with him, we should nothing trouble our selves to take him off from his concurrence with Moulin in that particular of reprobation. And wee of the first way are willing to professe, that God neither damnes nor decrees to damne any man, but for sinne and finall perseverance therein; nor so only, but in plain termes to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth Gods intention of damnation precede the consideration of sinne, and final impenitency; though we doe not make the consideration of sinne to precede the intention of damnation, as Moulin doth. And to my understanding, other reasons there are, which cast Divines upon the third way, then the declining of these absurdities mentioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of justice, doe presuppose sinne. And whereas Arminius in his conference with Iunius, produceth five reasons against the first way, no lesse then foure of them proceed on this manner; The first thus, Praedestinatio est voluntas Dei de illustrandâ suâ gloriâ per misericordiā & justitiā: At illa voluntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo. The third thus, Praedestinatio est pars providentiae administrantis & gubernātis humanū genus; ergò posterior naturâ actu creationis vel proposito creandi. Si posterior actu creationis vel propositio creandi hominē, jam homo praedestinationis objectum non est consideratus, ut nondū conditus. His 4th argument is this, Predestinatio est praeparatio supernaturalium bonorū; ergo praecedit communicatio naturaliū, & proptereà creatio in naturâ sive actu, sive in decreto Dei. His last reason is of the same nature thus, Illustratio sapientiae Dei per creationē prior est illustratione sapientiae Dei quae est administratio praedestinationis,