A64002:2180
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
M. Rutherford (I know) argueth somewhat against this, but I believe you will not plough with his Heifer.
M. Rutherford (I know) argueth somewhat against this, but I believe you will not plow with his Heifer.
Secondly, that D. Twice not only affirmeth but proveth, that things merely possible, are not the object of Gods decree, in his Book against Jackson p. 283. 333. & 394. Look we (saith he) upon the decrees of men, the wisest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done, they make choice to decree the doing of such courses, as seem most convenient: things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God, which he can do, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to pass; As for example, before the World was made, it was possible that the World should be made; was this by virtue of Gods decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free, it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been possible or no. His arguments are appliable unto Gods permissive as well as effective decrees, unto his conditional, as well as absolute decrees. From agents merely possible, pass we on unto such as do exist in some difference of time or other, and unto them some things are possible only in regard of an obediential power, some things are possible in regard of a natural power.
Secondly, that D. Twisse not only affirmeth but proveth, that things meerely possible, are not the object of Gods decree, in his Book against Iackson p. 283. 333. & 394. Looke we (saith he) upon the decrees of men, the wisest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done, they make choyce to decree the doing of such courses, as seeme most convenient: things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God, which he can doe, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to passe; As for example, before the World was made, it was possible that the World should be made; was this by vertue of Gods decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free, it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been possible or no. His arguments are applyable unto Gods permissive as well as effective decrees, unto his conditionall, as well as absolute decrees. From agents meerely possible, passe we on unto such as doe exist in some difference of time or other, and unto them some things are possible only in regard of an obedientiall power, some things are possible in regard of a naturall power.