A64002:2199
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But this Testimony perhaps may be of small authority with you, however his reason deserves your consideration. D. Twice indeed dissents from him, as touching the permission of the elicit acts of the will, but fully agreeth with him, as concerning the outward and imperate acts thereof, Hear his own words. Circa irrationalia agentia si versetur permissio, praesupponit, fateor, ejusmodi propensionem &c. Agentia vero rationalia quoties concernit permissio, eadem ratio erit quoad actus ipsorum imperatos: Neque enim proprie dicitur quis aut permitti, aut impediri, ne faciat aliquid exterius, nisi praesupponatur hoc ipsum velle, & intendere actu interno aut elicito: ex quo commode dicitur vel permitti facere quod intendebat, vel ne faciat quod volebat impediri, hactenus it aque agnosco propensionem quandam ad agendum praecedaneam esse permissioni.
But this Testimony perhaps may be of small authority with you, however his reason deserves your consideration. D. Twisse indeed dissents from him, as touching the permission of the elicite acts of the will, but fully agreeth with him, as concerning the outward and imperate acts thereof, Heare his owne words. Circa irrationalia agentia si versetur permissio, praesupponit, fateor, ejusmodi propensionem &c. Agentia vero rationalia quoties concernit permissio, eadem ratio erit quoad actus ipsorum imperatos: Neque enim proprie dicitur quis aut permitti, aut impediri, ne faciat aliquid exterius, nisi praesupponatur hoc ipsum velle, & intendere actu interno aut elicito: ex quo commode dicitur vel permitti facere quod intendebat, vel ne faciat quod volebat impediri, hactenus it aque agnosco propensionem quandam ad agendum praecedaneam esse permissioni.
Unto what Arminius and D. Twice say, I shall add this reason of mine own. Permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore as Aristotle hath taught us: l. Categ. Cap. 10. S. 11. Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non possit etiam competere habitus: And therefore we call not any thing deaf, blind, or dumb, but what is capable of hearing, sight and speech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and restrained from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or restrained from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propension or inclination, of which he hath no purpose or desire, no more than he can be constrained unto that, from which he is not averse, therefore neither can such an action be permitted unto him, if we take permission properly, (as Bannes saith) as it is not nuda negatio, sed privatio.