A64002:2200
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Unto what Arminius and D. Twice say, I shall add this reason of mine own. Permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore as Aristotle hath taught us: l. Categ. Cap. 10. S. 11. Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non possit etiam competere habitus: And therefore we call not any thing deaf, blind, or dumb, but what is capable of hearing, sight and speech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and restrained from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or restrained from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propension or inclination, of which he hath no purpose or desire, no more than he can be constrained unto that, from which he is not averse, therefore neither can such an action be permitted unto him, if we take permission properly, (as Bannes saith) as it is not nuda negatio, sed privatio.
Unto what Arminius and D. Twisse say, I shall adde this reason of mine own. Permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore as Aristotle hath taught us: l. Categ. Cap. 10. S. 11. Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non possit etiam competere habitus: And therefore we call not any thing deafe, blind, or dumbe, but what is capable of hearing, sight and speech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and restrayned from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or restrayned from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propension or inclination, of which he hath no purpose or desire, no more than he can be constrayned unto that, from which he is not averse, therefore neither can such an action be permitted unto him, if we take permission properly, (as Bannes saith) as it is not nuda negatio, sed privatio.
By this time the Reader, I suppose, is satisfied, that God doth not permit every man to murder or destroy the life of every one that cometh in his way; and therefore consequently, he hath not decreed or intended any such permission. As for the limitation which you bring to qualify your assertion, it nothing mends the matter: for I have proved the assertion to be false in it self, by arguments, that fear not the light of your trial or examination: and false assertions cannot be made good by any limitations whatsoever; so much I learned when I was a Boy from Keckerm. System. Log. lib. 2. cap. 4. Quicquid subjecto limitativè tribuitur, id verè tribuitur. But suppose this assertion were justifiable, by some limitation or other, yet not by this, which you bring; because this natural power to do the execution, (as you speak) is insufficient to denominate the permission of murder; because 'tis consistent with the opposite of such a permission, restraint from murder, &c.