A64002:2250
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Secondly, from his infinite blessedness or happiness, which is such as that he hath all things desirable. But if he should not have known things to come he should be without a perfection, desirable by every intelligent or rational nature. This was Bradwardines argument; Si Deus quaedam vera nesciret, posset desiderare & velle scire illa; omnis enim rationalis natura naturaliter scire desiderat, quare & cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem universaliter efficacem, posset illa scire & non novitèr; quia tunc non semper esset actualissimus, scientissimus, perfectissimus, beatissimus, & immutailis penitus, contra tertiam partem & sextam: necessario ergo aeternalitèr omnia vera novit.
Secondly, from his infinite blessednesse or happinesse, which is such as that he hath all things desireable. But if he should not have knowne things to come he should be without a perfection, desireable by every intelligent or rationall nature. This was Bradwardines argument; Si Deus quaedam vera nesciret, posset desiderare & velle scire illa; omnis enim rationalis natura naturaliter scire desiderat, quare & cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem universaliter efficacem, posset illa scire & non novitèr; quia tunc non semper esset actualissimus, scientissimus, perfectissimus, beatissimus, & immutailis penitus, contra tertiam partem & sextam: necessario ergo aeternalitèr omnia vera novit.
Thirdly, from his unchangeableness, which is affirmable of all his other Attributes, and consequently of his knowledge. But now his knowledge if it were not of things whilst they were to come, it would by actual existence of them be enlarged, and so changed. This argument is urged by Durand, Cumel, Rada, Suarez, and others. God knows thing whiles present, for otherwise he should be ignorant of that which men and Angels know, therefore he knew them whiles future, otherwise by the presence of them, something de novo should accrue unto Gods knowledge, which cannot be without a change.1
Thirdly, from his unchangeablenesse, which is affirmable of all his other Attributes, and consequently of his knowledge. But now his knowledge if it were not of things whilest they were to come, it would by actuall existence of them be enlarged, and so changed. This argument is urged by Durand, Cumel, Rada, Suarez, and others. God knowes thing whiles present, for otherwise he should be ignorant of that which men and Angells know, therefore he knew them whiles future, otherwise by the presence of them, something de novo should accrue unto Gods knowledge, which cannot be without a change.