A64003:146
A treatise of Mr. Cottons clearing certain doubts concerning predestination together with an examination…A treatise of Mr. Cottons clearing certaine doubts concerning predestination together with an examination…
A treatise of Mr. Cottons clearing certain doubts concerning predestination together with an examination thereof / written by William Twice ...A treatise of Mr. Cottons clearing certaine doubts concerning predestination together with an examination thereof / written by William Twisse ...
London: printed by J.D. for Andrew Crook, 1646
AN EXAMINATION of a Treatise written by Master Cotton, for the clea… › QUESTION •.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
not that there ever was any such particular decree conceived by God, distinct from the former, as the Arminians feign; but that from the former particular decrees resulteth the denomination of such a decree as this; as if you should say, If God did decree to save Peter and Paul, it followeth, that God did decree to save some: not that God did first indefinitely decree to save some, and then decree that Peter and Paul should be two of them. And to reward men according to their works, is no more a work of ⟨p. 53⟩hatred then of love; but as it is indefinite, so it is indifferent to prove in the issue either a work of hatred or of love; as that God, Who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ, Heb. 13. 21. shall work in some that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ, and not in others.
not that there ever was any such particular decree conceived by God, distinct from the former, as the Arminians feigne; but that from the former particular decrees resulteth the denomination of such a decree as this; as if you should say, If God did decree to save Peter and Paul, it followeth, that God did decree to save some: not that God did first indefinitely decree to save some, and then decree that Peter and Paul should be two of them. And to reward men according to their workes, is no more a worke of ⟨p. 53⟩hatred then of love; but as it is indefinite, so it is indifferent to prove in the issue either a worke of hatred or of love; as that God, Who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ, Heb. 13. 21. shall worke in some that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ, and not in others.
Neither will it follow here-hence, that God rejecteth and reprobateth some upon presupposall of disobedience, more then that he electeth and predestinateth others upon presupposall of their obedience; for undoubtedly God purposed as well to reward the godly according to their works, as the ungodly according to theirs; though, I confess, there is a great difference between the condition of evil works and good works; evil works being meritorious of punishment, good works no way meritorious of reward: but this nothing hinders the course of remuneration in general: And again, what is wanting of merit on the part of Gods Elect, is abundantly supplied by the merit and satisfaction of Christ. It followeth, I confess, that upon disobedience on the one side (provided it be final, not otherwise; for, undoubtedly, abuse both of means of grace in Christ, and other talents and helps of the knowledge of God in nature, is found also in the Elect, though not final; for, Novimus, saith Austin, that God hath converted non modo aversas à vera fide, sed & adversas verae fidei voluntates) God damneth some for disobedience; and it is no less true, that upon obedience on the other side, God saves the others. But this opinion, I confess, was heretofore shaped by Doctor Overall, and perhaps taken from Caterinus, but with a little variation, and, if I be not deceived, first devised by the Author of the two books, De vocatione Gentium; all which notwithstanding are orthodox in the point of Election throughout, excepting Caterinus, whose orthodoxy therein is only in part. But, in few words, I will disprove this latter position of yours, by your own rules: For thus I dispute, If God did first fore-see mans disobedience, and then ordain them to condemnation, then God did first decree to permit this disobedience, before he did decree to damn them for it. Whence it followeth, that the permission of this sin was first in intention, and consequently, last in execution: that is, God must first damn them, and afterwards permit their disobedience, whereby they deserve damnation. Yet,