So that even those things which God sinit sieri, vult sieri: 1Good things he will have come to pass, by his working of them; evil things he will have come to pass, by his suffering of them. Nay, otherwise it were impossible he should foreknow them; for unless they are future, they are not knowable to be future. ⟨p. 69⟩But how can it be, that things contingent, and in their own nature indifferent, as well to be not future as future; how, I say, is it possible that they should pass out of this indifferent condition into a condition determinate; and things merely possible in their own nature, become future without a cause? And what cause can be devised of this transition, but the will of God? For, from everlasting, nothing was extant to cause them of things possible to become future, but God himself: and in God himself, nothing can be imagined to be the cause hereof, but the will of God. This is the insoluble demonstration that cuts the throat of Scientia media, whereupon the Jesuits and Arminians, and all that oppose the absoluteness of Gods proceedings, do, and must rely; either wittingly or unwittingly, and whether they will or no; unless they will directly turn Atheists, and with Cicero deny that God fore-knows things that are to come. So that upon supposition of Gods will to permit Adam to fall, it was necessary that Adam should fall; necessary, I say, that he should fall: But how? Not necessarily, but contingently, and freely: and no other necessity is at this day found in man for the performing of any particular sinful act, but such as is joined with liberty; and that in such sort, as that the necessity is only Secundum quid; the liberty is Simpliciter: so called, I say, in respect of any particular act. But, I confess, there is an absolute necessity of sinning, in general, laid upon man by the Fall of Adam; whereby it comes to pass, that whether a man commits a sinful act, then questionless he sinneth; or whether he omit a sinful act, yet therein he sinneth also; in as much as he doth not abstain from it in a gracious manner. I come to the second Reason: Again, you say, In Christ they have so much knowledge and grace revealed to them, and offered, as is sufficient to bring them on to see their impotency in themselves, and to stir them up to seek for help and strength, and life in him, where it is to be found;
So that even those things which God sinit sieri, vult sieri: 1Good things he will have come to passe, by his working of them; evill things hee will have come to passe, by his suffering of them. Nay, otherwise it were impossible hee should foreknow them; for unlesse they are future, they are not knowable to be future. ⟨p. 69⟩But how can it be, that things contingent, and in their owne nature indifferent, as well to be not future as future; how, I say, is it possible that they should passe out of this indifferent condition into a condition determinate; and things meerely possible in their owne nature, become future without a cause? And what cause can be devised of this transition, but the will of God? For, from everlasting, nothing was extant to cause them of things possible to become future, but God himselfe: and in God himselfe, nothing can be imagined to be the cause hereof, but the will of God. This is the insoluble demonstration that cuts the throat of Scientia media, whereupon the Jesuites and Arminians, and all that oppose the absolutenesse of Gods proceedings, doe, and must relye; either wittingly or unwittingly, and whether they will or no; unlesse they will directly turne Atheists, and with Cicero deny that God fore-knowes things that are to come. So that upon supposition of Gods will to permit Adam to fall, it was necessary that Adam should fall; necessary, I say, that hee should fall: But how? Not necessarily, but contingently, and freely: and no other necessity is at this day found in man for the performing of any particular sinfull act, but such as is joyned with liberty; and that in such sort, as that the necessity is only Secundum quid; the liberty is Simpliciter: so called, I say, in respect of any particular act. But, I confesse, there is an absolute necessity of sinning, in generall, laid upon man by the Fall of Adam; whereby it comes to passe, that whether a man commits a sinfull act, then questionlesse hee sinneth; or whether hee omit a sinfull act, yet therein hee sinneth also; in as much as hee doth not abstaine from it in a gracious manner. I come to the second Reason: Againe, you say, In Christ they have so much knowledge and grace revealed to them, and offered, as is sufficient to bring them on to see their impotency in themselves, and to stirre them up to seeke for help and strength, and life in him, where it is to bee found;
- 1Enchirid. cap. 95.
