A treatise of Mr. Cottons clearing certain doubts concerning predestination together with an examination…A treatise of Mr. Cottons clearing certaine doubts concerning predestination together with an examination…

That no will of God is conditional, we have the concurrent ¹consent both of our, and Popish Divines. For both Piscator maintains it against Uorstius, and Bradwardine demonstrates it: And this condition which you speak of, can be no less then some motive cause: & Aquinas hath professed that never any was so made, as to affirm that there was any cause of Predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis, as touching the act of God predestinating; and that for no other reason then because there can be no cause of the will of God, quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of God willing. Whence it followeth manifestly, that in like sort there can be no cause of reprobation neither quoad actum reprobantis, as touching the act of God reprobating: and consequently no condition. As for the contrary allegations out of Scripture, and out of Divines, I shall be content to consider them, whensoever you shall produce them; but I am persuaded you will not be forwards to trouble your self there-about, after I shall present unto you how incongruous a course you take to the justifying of that which here you affirm. And not incongruous only, but most dangerous, tending manifestly to the utter overthrow of the Freeness of Gods grace in Predestination; which indeed very frequently you shake in this unhappy discourse of yours. As God in fullness of time doth administer and dispense the ways of his providence, so (you say) be decreed to dispense them in the same manner from all eternity. We grant it willingly; but what of all this? you add, that in dispensing the performance of the Covenant of works, the Lord punisheth and rewardeth the creature according to the condition of obedience or disobedience performed by it, or rather by the persons under it: This also we willingly grant. But what do you infer herehence? only this; Therefore surely he decreed to carry such works of his providence upon the same conditions. Now this conclusion we embrace as readily as your self; but this is far from justifying the decree of God to be conditional. Nay, your self do plainly express, that the carriage of ⟨p. 248⟩such works of his providence is upon such conditions: Not that Gods decree is upon such conditions: which is as much as to say in plain terms, that the execution of his decree proceeds upon condition, not the decree it self.

That no will of God is conditionall, we have the concurrent