A64611:2768
The sum of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinity / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latin edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professor of Divinity in Heidelberg ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabetical table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversy, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theological miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errors of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the original Latin copy by A.R.The summe of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinitie / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latine edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professour of Divinity in Heidelberge ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabeticall table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversie, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theologicall miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errours of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the originall Latine copie by A.R.
London: printed by James Young, 1645
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Object. 1. In the Apostles time all things were common: Therefore now also all goods ought to be common. Answ. 1. There is a dissimilitude and a far different reason in these examples. For the community of goods was then both easy to be compassed, and necessary to be contrived. It was easy, because they were few: It was necessary, because they were in danger, lest, if they sold them not, they should be taken from them by force. Now there is neither that easiness, nor necessity. Wherefore the Apostles were induced upon good causes, why they should then bring in community of goods, which causes have long since ceased, and now are not. 2. They did it not being enforced thereto by any law, but freely: For their parting with their goods in common was voluntary, none was compelled unto it. And therefore Peter saith to Ananias, Whiles it remained, appertained it not to thee? 1And after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? 3. This custom was of force only at that time; for afterwards upon change of these causes, this custom also ceased. 4. This community of goods was not in all Churches: because in Macedonia and in Achaia, collection was made of alms, which were sent to Jerusalem. Object. 2. Natural things are unchangeable. Community of goods is natural: Therefore Community of goods is unchangeable, and therefore is now also to be observed. Answ. Natural things are unchangeable, in respect of the Moral Law, but not in respect of natural profit and utility. Object. 3. Christ saith unto the young man, If thou wilt be perfect, sell all, and give it to the poor. Answ. 1. The examples have a diverse reason: Because this was a special calling of a Disciple, belonging to an Apostle-ship. 2. Christ would thereby signify, how far off he was from the perfection of the law, whereof he gloried. 3. He saith not: Give it in common, or put it in the common treasury: but, Give it to the poor. Object. 4. All things are Christs, therefore all things are Christians. Answ. All things are Christians, or ours, as concerning the right to the thing, but not as concerning the right in the thing. All things are due unto us, but we may not lay hands of any thing before the time. Object. 5. All things between friends are common. Answ.
OBject. 1. In the Apostles time all things were common: Therefore now also all goods ought to be common. Answ. 1. There is a dissimilitude and a farre different reason in these examples. For the community of goods was then both easie to be compassed, and necessary to be contrived. It was easie, because they were few: It was necessary, because they were in danger, lest, if they sold them not, they should be taken from them by force. Now there is neither that easinesse, nor necessity. Wherefore the Apostles were induced upon good causes, why they should then bring in community of goods, which causes have long since ceased, and now are not. 2. They did it not being enforced thereto by any law, but freely: For their parting with their goods in common was voluntary, none was compelled unto it. And therefore Peter saith to Ananias, Whiles it remained, appertained it not to thee? 1And after it was sold, was it not in thine owne power? 3. This custome was of force onely at that time; for afterwards upon change of these causes, this custome also ceased. 4. This community of goods was not in all Churches: because in Macedony and in Achaia, collection was made of almes, which were sent to Jerusalem. Object. 2. Naturall things are unchangeable. Community of goods is naturall: Therefore Community of goods is unchangeable, and therefore is now also to be observed. Answ. Naturall things are unchangeable, in respect of the Morall Law, but not in respect of naturall profit and utility. Object. 3. Christ saith unto the young man, If thou wilt be perfect, sell all, and give it to the poore. Answ. 1. The examples have a diverse reason: Because this was a speciall calling of a Disciple, belonging to an Apostle-ship. 2. Christ would thereby signifie, how far off hee was from the perfection of the law, whereof he gloried. 3. Hee saith not: Give it in common, or put it in the common treasurie: but, Give it to the poor. Object. 4. All things are Christs, therefore all things are Christians. Answ. All things are Christians, or ours, as concerning the right to the thing, but not as concerning the right in the thing. All things are due unto us, but we may not lay hands of any thing before the time. Object. 5. All things between freinds are common. Answ.
All things between friends are common, as touching the use of them, and as touching the duties and parts of honesty and commodity, or, as touching necessary use, being levelled by the rule of Reason: For we are to ask things of our friends, which ⟨p. 610⟩we would have them ask of us. But all things among friends are not common as concerning the possession and right: because unto every one belongeth a distinct possession and right of his own goods. This possession of goods, or distinction of rights is enacted (as we have said) by this commandment, because if we may not steal, we must then possess our own: and that for these causes; 1. To maintain our selves and ours honestly. 2. To yield something for the maintenance of the Ministry. 3. For the maintenance of the common-wealth. 4. For the maintenance of our friends, and relief of the poor according to our ability.
All things between friends are common, as touching the use of them, and as touching the duties and parts of honesty and commodity, or, as touching necessary use, being levelled by the rule of Reason: For wee are to aske things of our friends, which ⟨p. 610⟩wee would have them aske of us. But all things among friends are not common as concerning the possession and right: because unto every one belongeth a distinct possession and right of his owne goods. This possession of goods, or distinction of rights is enacted (as wee have said) by this commandement, because if we may not steale, we must then possesse our owne: and that for these causes; 1. To maintaine our selves and ours honestly. 2. To yield something for the maintenance of the Ministery. 3. For the maintenance of the common-wealth. 4. For the maintenance of our friends, and reliefe of the poore according to our ability.
Answ. That I bear no false witness against any mana, neither falsify any mans wordsb, neither back-bite or reproach any manc, nor condemn any man rashly or unheardd; but avoid and shun with all carefulness all kind of lies, and deceit, as the proper works of the devile, except I mean to stir up against me the most grievous wrath of Godf: And that in judgements and other affairs I follow the truth, and freely and constantly profess the matter as it indeed isg. And moreover, defend and increase, as much as in me lieth, the good name and estimation of othersh.
Answ. That I beare no false witnesse against any mana, neither falsifie any mans wordsb, neither back-bite or reproach any manc, nor condemn any man rashly or unheardd; but avoid and shun with all carefulnesse all kind of lies, and deceit, as the proper works of the divelle, except I meane to stir up against mee the most grievous wrath of Godf
The drift or end of this Commandment is, the ordinance and maintenance of the truth among men. Neither is in this Commandment only bearing false witness forbidden, but all things which are of near affinity therewith, the general whereof is lying. Thou shalt not bear false witness of thy neighbour, or against thy neighbour. In this negative Commandment is comprehended an affirmative: which is, Bear therefore true witness of, or for thy neighbour; that is, be true and desirous of learning and knowing the truth. Wherefore the original and general head of those virtues, which are here commanded is truth, or trueness in our speech, opinion, judgement, covenants, and in our doctrine: For the name of Truth here, is taken for the agreement or correspondence of our knowledge or speech with the thing, whereof our speech is. True we term the speech it self agreeing with the thing. Contrariwise, the general head of such vices as are here condemned, is false-hood in any of the fore-alleged premisses.
THe drift or end of this Commandement is, the ordinance and maintenance of the truth among men. Neither is in this Commandement onely bearing false witnesse forbidden, but all things which are of neere affinity therewith, the generall whereof is lying. Thou shalt not beare false witnesse of thy neighbour, or against thy neighbour. In this negative Commandement is comprehended an affirmative: which is, Beare therefore true witnesse of, or for thy neighbour; that is, be true and desirous of learning and knowing the truth. Wherefore the originall and generall head of those vertues, which are here commanded is truth, or truenesse in our speech, opinion, judgement, covenants, and in our doctrine: For the name of Truth here, is taken for the agreement or correspondence of our knowledge or speech with the thing, whereof our speech is. True wee terme the speech it selfe agreeing with the thing. Contrariwise, the generall head of such vices as are here condemned, is false-hood in any of the fore-alledged premisses.
The chief and principal virtue, which is here commanded, is Truth. 1. Truth or trueness is a virtue,1 whereby we love true opinions or speeches, and seek after them, and receive them, and gladly profess and defend them, according as both our duty, and persons, places, times, and other circumstances require, unto the glory of God, and the safety of our neighbour. This end maketh that the devil cannot be said to be true, although he sometimes speak that which is true: For he is true, who speaketh and loveth the truth, and doth affection it for the glory of God, and the safety of his neighbour. Of this virtue Aristotle briefly, but learnedly, disputeth in his Morals, and referreth truth in bargains to justice. He calleth him properly a true man, who, when it steedeth him nought at all, yet is true in his speech and whole life, and is habitually such an one. Truth may also be defined on this wise:2 Truth is a firm election in the Will, whereby we constantly embrace true sentences and opinions, speak that which is true, keep covenants ⟨p. 611⟩and promises, and avoid all deceitful dissemblings both in speech and outward gesture. True conf•ssion is commanded both in this, and in the third Commandment: 3as oftentimes the same virtue is required to the obedience of diverse commandments. But in the third Commandment true confession is required, as it is the honour and worship of God, immediately respecting God: and here it is commanded, as there is a will in us not to deceive our neighbour, but to wish his safety and well-fare. Under the name of truth, we comprise liberty of speech: which is a virtue, whereby, as much as the time, place, and necessity requireth, we profess the truth freely, and boldly, and are not with-drawn through the fear of dangers. Unto Truth, 4in the defect, are repugnant, §15Lying▪ unto which appertain all guiles, dissembling, lies of courtesy, slanders, back-bitings, evil speakings: which kinds of lying are repugnant also unto fairness of manners and conditions. Likewise, Negligence in understanding the truth of things, and searching true opinions, and wilful Ignorance, which is a ling in the mind.
Lying is to speak otherwise, or to signify otherwise by outward gestures, than thou thinkest, and than the thing it self is. For, to lye, is as much as to go against thine own knowledge. All lying, which doth expressly and plainly dissemble the truth is here condemned: neither are officious lies, or lies of courtesy excused,1 because evil is not to be done that good may come of it. And well saith Lactantius:2 We must never lye, because a lye either always hurteth or deceiveth some man. But a truth which is uttered by a figure is no lie,3 whether he understand it or no with whom we deal. This is to be observed, that we be not rigorous in examining the actions of the Saints, and also that we excuse not those things which have no need to be excused. 4Officious lies are commonly defended by the example of the Egyptian Mid-wives, which lied unto the King, and were blessed of God. But God blessed them not therefore because they lied; but because they feared God, and slew not the Infants of the Israelites. Object. That which profiteth another, and hurteth no man, 5is not sin, and therefore may be done. A dutiful lye is of such quality. Therefore it is no sin, but may be made. Answ. The Minor is false: because that which God forbiddeth, always harmeth; and if it profit at all, this is but by accident, through the goodness of God. Unto Truth, in the excess, is repugnant,6 1. Untimely professing of the truth: which is, to cast pearls to swine, and to give that which is holy unto dogs, as Christ saith, who by these words doth wholly forbid unnecessary and untimely professing of the truth. For as the verse hath it in the Poet; He that warneth out of time doth harm. 2. Curiosity, which is to search after things unnecessary or unpossible. These things may suffice for this chief and principal virtue of the ninth Commandment. The virtues which follow, wait upon truth, and they all are as it were of truths retinue.
IIFairness of mind is a virtue which taketh well things well or doubtfully spoken or done, and interpreteth them in the better part, to wit, as far as there are any reasonable causes to induce thereto, and doth not easily conceive suspicions, neither sticketh upon suspicions: though they be such as are just, and have reasonable causes, he doth not ground thereon, neither directeth his actions accordingly, neither decreeth or determineth ought by them. Or, Fairness of mind is a neighbour-virtue unto truth, allowing of others wills upon probable reason, and hating all evil-mindedness, and drawing also some things that are doubtful to the better part: and hoping indeed that which is good; but yet, as touching mutable things, thinking that the wills of men may change, and that a man may err concerning another's will, seeing the infoldings and secret places of mans mind are not beheld. The extremes of this virtue, in the defect, are, Slandering and Suspiciousness. 2Slandering is not only falsely to criminate and attach the innocent,§1 but also to interpret things indifferently spoken in the worser part,3 or also to interlace and coin some false-hood. Suspiciousness, is to take things well or ambiguously spoken, in the worser part, to suspect evil things, of those that are good:§2 or to suspect without cause; or also to make too much of true suspicions.4 It is lawful for us sometimes to ⟨p. 612⟩suspect,5 except we will be fools. Beware of men: be ye wise as serpents, and innocent as doves. But it is one thing to conceive a suspicion, and another to dwell on it, and continually nourish it.6 Now suspicion is an opinion of evil of some man for some probable cause, whether true or apparent. Suspicion is two-fold: Good and Evil. 1. Evil suspicion is, when it proceedeth from a cause either altogether false, or unsufficient; as when a cause is feigned where no cause is, or when our neighbour is innocent: Good suspicion is, when we suspect on good ground, or cause sufficient. 2. Evil suspicion is, when on bare suspicion we determine something: Good suspicion, when the matter is left in suspense, as long as there are probable reasons on both parts. 3. Evil suspicion is, when on suspicion we take counsel how to harm some man: Good suspicion doth the contrary. 4. Evil suspicion is, when on suspicion we conceive hatred: Good suspicion doth the contrary.
In the excess foolish credulity, and foolish Flattery. 1Credulity is hastily or unadvisedly to interpret any thing, or to assent to one without just and probable cause; or, to believe a thing of another, when there are manifest and probable reasons to the contrary.2 Flattery or assentation is to praise, or like things not to be praised, thereby to get either the goods or favour of another man. Fairness of mind is an assistant or special kind of truth: Therefore it is also here together with truth commanded.
In the excesse foolish credulity, and foolish Flattery. 1Credulity is hastily or unadvisedly to interpret any thing, or to assent to one without just and probable cause; or, to beleeve a thing of another, when there are manifest and probable reasons to the contrary.2 Flattery or assentation is to praise, or like things not to be praised, thereby to get either the goods or favour of another man. Fairnesse of mind is an assistant or speciall kind of truth: Therefore it is also here together with truth commanded.
IIISimplicity, which is open truth without wrinkles, or fetches and compassings: or, it is a virtue which doth properly and plainly speak and do such things as are true, right, and declared in arts and common life. Truth is tempered with simplicity and fairness of mind or conditions.2 The extremes of simplicity are, Feigned simplicity, and doubleness in manners and conversation.
IIISimplicity, which is open truth without wrinckles, or fetches and compassings: or, it is a vertue which doth properly and plainly speak and doe such things as are true, right, and declared in arts and common life. Truth is tempered with simplicity and fairnesse of mind or conditions.2 The extremes of simplicity are, Feigned simplicity, and doublenesse in manners and conversation.
IVConstancy, which is a virtue not departing from the known truth, neither altering his purpose without good and necessary causes, but constantly speaking and doing such things as are true, just, and necessary. Or, it is a virtue persisting in the truth once found, known and approved, and in the like manner professing and defending the same. Constancy is necessary for the preservation and maintenance of the truth:2 therefore it is here also commanded. The extremes hereof, in the defect, are Unconstancy or Lightness, which is to alter true purposes and opinions without reason. In the excess the extremes are Pertinacy or Stoical Stiffness and rigour, which is a vice arising from a confidence in his own wit, or from pride and ostentation, refusing to yield or depart from his opinion, albeit it be such as he seeth by strong reasons to be false, but persisting in false opinions, or unjust, or unprofitable actions.
IVConstancy, which is a vertue not departing from the knowne truth, neither altering his purpose without good and necessary causes, but constantly speaking and doing such things as are true, just, and necessary. Or, it is a vertue persisting in the truth once found, knowne and approved, and in the like manner professing and defending the same. Constancy is necessary for the preservation and maintenance of the truth:2 therefore it is here also commanded. The extremes hereof, in the defect, are Ʋnconstancy or Lightnesse, which is to alter true purposes and opinions without reason. In the excesse the extremes are Pertinacy or Stoicall Stiffenesse and rigour, which is a vice arising from a confidence in his owne wit, or from pride and ostentation, refusing to yield or depart from his opinion, albeit it be such as hee seeth by strong reasons to be false, but persisting in false opinions, or unjust, or unprofitable actions.
VDocility, or a readiness to learn, which is a virtue searching after the reasons of true opinions, easily believing, and yielding to those that teach or show better things, and that upon certain reason, and framing his will ready to assent unto true or probable reasons, and to leave those things which before he held and embraced. The same are the extremes of Docility which are of Constancy, whereunto also this Docility is necessary;2 for, Constancy without Docility degenerateth into Pertinacie: and, Docility without Constancy, degenerateth into Levity. Now all these virtues which have been numbered, agree and are linked very well one with another: For Truth must be tempered with Fairness of mind and Simplicity, perceived and known by Docility, preserved and maintained by Constancy. And so these former virtues are required to the being of Truth: the three virtues following are required to the profitable being of Truth in the world.
VDocility, or a readinesse to learne, which is a vertue searching after the reasons of true opinions, easily beleeving, and yielding to those that teach or shew better things, and that upon certain reason, and framing his will ready to assent unto true or probable reasons, and to leave those things which before hee held and imbraced. The same are the extremes of Docility which are of Constancy, whereunto also this Docility is necessary;2 for, Constancy without Docility degenerateth into Pertinacie: and, Docility without Constancy, degenerateth into Levity. Now all these vertues which have been numbred, agree and are linked very well one with another: For Truth must be tempered with Fairnesse of mind and Simplicity, perceived and knowne by Docility, preserved and maintained by Constancy. And so these former vertues are required to the being of Truth: the three vertues following are required to the profitable being of Truth in the world.
THe chiefe and principall vertue, which is here commanded, is Truth. 1. Truth or truenesse is a vertue,1 whereby wee love true opinions or speeches, and seek after them, and receive them, and gladly professe and defend them, according as both our dutie, and persons, places, times, and other circumstances require, unto the glorie of God, and the safety of our neighbour. This end maketh that the divell cannot be said to be true, although hee sometimes speake that which is true: For he is true, who speaketh and loveth the truth, and doth affection it for the glory of God, and the safety of his neighbour. Of this vertue Aristotle briefly, but learnedly, disputeth in his Moralls, and referreth truth in bargaines to justice. Hee calleth him properly a true man, who, when it steedeth him nought at all, yet is true in his speech and whole life, and is habitually such an one. Truth may also be defined on this wise:2 Truth is a firme election in the Will, whereby we constantly imbrace true sentences and opinions, speake that which is true, keep covenants ⟨p. 611⟩and promises, and avoid all deceitfull dissemblings both in speech and outward gesture. True conf•ssion is commanded both in this, and in the third Commandement: 3as oftentimes the same vertue is required to the obedience of diverse commandements. But in the third Commandement true confession is required, as it is the honour and worship of God, immediately respecting God: and here it is commanded, as there is a will in us not to deceive our neighbour, but to wish his safety and wel-fare. Under the name of truth, wee comprise liberty of speech: which is a vertue, whereby, as much as the time, place, and necessity requireth, wee professe the truth freely, and boldly, and are not with-drawne through the feare of dangers. Unto Truth, 4in the defect, are repugnant, §15Lying▪ unto which appertaine all guiles, dissembling, lies of courtesie, slanders, back-bitings, evill speakings: which kindes of lying are repugnant also unto fairenesse of manners and conditions. Likewise, Negligence in understanding the truth of things, and searching true opinions, and wilfull Ignorance, which is a l•ing in the minde. §26Vanity or Levity, which is a readinesse to lying. Hee is vaine who lyeth much often, and easily, and that without any shame. A Lyer is he, who hath a desire to lye.
IIFairnesse of mind is a vertue which taketh well things well or doubtfully spoken or done, and interpreteth them in the better part, to wit, as farre as there are any reasonable causes to induce thereto, and doth not easily conceive suspicions, neither sticketh upon suspicions: though they be such as are just, and have reasonable causes, hee doth not ground thereon, neither directeth his actions accordingly, neither decreeth or determineth ought by them. Or, Fairnesse of minde is a neighbour-vertue unto truth, allowing of others wils upon probable reason, and hating all evil-mindednesse, and drawing also some things that are doubtfull to the better part: and hoping indeed that which is good; but yet, as touching mutable things, thinking that the wils of men may change, and that a man may erre concerning anothers will, seeing the infoldings and secret places of mans minde are not beheld. The extremes of this vertue, in the defect, are, Slandering and Suspiciousnesse. 2Slandering is not onely falsely to criminate and attach the innocent,§1 but also to interpret things indifferently spoken in the worser part,3 or also to enterlace and coyne some false-hood. Suspiciousnesse, is to take things well or ambiguously spoken, in the worser part, to suspect evill things, of those that are good:§2 or to suspect without cause; or also to make too much of true suspicions.4 It is lawful for us sometimes to ⟨p. 612⟩suspect,5 except wee will be fooles. Beware of men: be yee wise as serpents, and innocent as doves. But it is one thing to conceive a suspicion, and another to dwell on it, and continually nourish it.6 Now suspicion is an opinion of evill of some man for some probable cause, whether true or apparent. Suspicion is two-fold: Good and Evill. 1. Evill suspicion is, when it proceedeth from a cause either altogether false, or unsufficient; as when a cause is feigned where no cause is, or when our neighbour is innocent: Good suspicion is, when wee suspect on good ground, or cause sufficient. 2. Evill suspicion is, when on bare suspicion wee determine something: Good suspicion, when the matter is left in suspence, as long as there are probable reasons on both parts. 3. Evill suspicion is, when on suspicion wee take counsell how to harme some man: Good suspicion doth the contrary. 4. Evill suspicion is, when on suspicion we conceive hatred: Good suspicion doth the contrary.