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The sum of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinity / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latin edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professor of Divinity in Heidelberg ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabetical table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversy, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theological miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errors of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the original Latin copy by A.R.The summe of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinitie / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latine edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professour of Divinity in Heidelberge ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabeticall table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversie, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theologicall miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errours of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the originall Latine copie by A.R.
London: printed by James Young, 1645
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
NO confused or disordered things have their being, or are governed by the providence of God: But whatsoever things are under the Sun, are confused, 1because all are vanity: Therefore they are not ruled and governed by divine providence. Answ. The ⟨p. 208⟩2Major proposition, consisting of doubtful terms, is to be distinguished. No confuse things (true, if they be simply confuse) are governed by the providence of God, that is, the providence of God working them, as they are confuse. All things that are under the Sun, that is, humane things are confuse and vain: true, but not simply, so that no order and good at all lieth hid, and is found in that confusion. For if they were such, God, for his great goodness and justice, would not permit them to be done. Wherefore, if by the confusion of the world they collect and conclude, that there is no providence, there is more avouched in the conclusion, then was contained in the premisses; or they proceed from that which is in some respect so, to conclude the same to be simply and absolutely so. For whereas many things in the world are well ordered, as the celestial motions, the preservation of the kinds of all things, common-weals, the punishments of the wicked men, & many more, it may not by this argument be concluded of all things, but of those only, which are done against the order by God appointed, that they are not governed by his providence: but those things, in which a most manifest order doth appear, shall be an evident testimony of Gods wisdom and effectual working. But if then they conclude, that those disordered things are not ruled and governed of God; so also shall there be more said in the conclusion, than was in the premisses. For it followeth thereof, Not that the things confuse and troubled, but that the confusion or troubling of order, which is in them, is not of God: As the wicked were created of God, albeit their wickedness proceeded not from God, but from themselves. For every thing is not necessarily avouched of the concrete, or subject so qualified, which is affirmed of the abstract, or quality it self. Wherefore, if it be again replied, putting this Major, That disordered things are not, or are not ruled of God: and therefore many things in the world not done by his providence; even thus too, is the Major diversly faulty. For, 1.
NO confused or disordered things have their beeing, or are governed by the providence of God: But whatsoever things are under the Sunne, are confused, 1because all are vanity: Therefore they are not ruled and governed by divine providence. Answ. The ⟨p. 208⟩2Major proposition, consisting of doubtfull termes, is to be distinguished. No confuse things (true, if they be simply confuse) are governed by the providence of God, that is, the providence of God working them, as they are confuse. All things that are under the Sunne, that is, humane things are confuse and vaine: true, but not simply, so that no order and good at all lyeth hid, and is found in that confusion. For if they were such, God, for his great goodnesse and justice, would not permit them to be done. Wherefore, if by the confusion of the world they collect and conclude, that there is no providence, there is more avouched in the conclusion, then was contained in the premisses; or they proceed from that which is in some respect so, to conclude the same to be simply and absolutely so. For whereas many things in the world are well ordered, as the celestiall motions, the preservation of the kinds of all things, common-weals, the punishments of the wicked men, & many more, it may not by this argument be concluded of all things, but of those only, which are done against the order by God appointed, that they are not governed by his providence: but those things, in which a most manifest order doth appeare, shall be an evident testimony of Gods wisedome and effectuall working. But if then they conclude, that those disordered things are not ruled and governed of God; so also shall there be more said in the conclusion, than was in the premisses. For it followeth thereof, Not that the things confuse and troubled, but that the confusion or troubling of order, which is in them, is not of God: As the wicked were created of God, albeit their wickednesse proceeded not from God, but from themselves. For every thing is not necessarily avouched of the concrete, or subject so qualified, which is affirmed of the abstract, or quality it selfe. Wherefore, if it be again replied, putting this Major, That disordered things are not, or are not ruled of God: and therfore many things in the world not done by his providence; even thus too, is the Major diversly faulty. For, 1.
Be it that it be granted, that things disordered, if they be simply such, are not, or are not ruled of God:1 yet cannot this be granted of them, if both confusion and order in divers respects be found in them. Now neither Devils nor men commit any thing so repugnant to the order settled by God, wherein, albeit in respect of their corrupt will it be most disordered, there is not yet the most wise order of divine justice, power, and goodness lying hid under that confusion, which themselves had caused: and for the most part also the same doth manifestly appear; the event, or God himself by his word declaring it. Great confusion was there in the Jews detestable murder, when they crucified the Son of God, and yet notwithstanding the hand and counsel of God hath defined and determined nothing with more wonderful order and wisdom, than the death of his Son for our sins. All humane things therefore are vain; not in respect of the will and decree, or providence of God (for if we respect it, they are most well ordered, even such as in mens judgements seem most disordered) but in respect of men, as concerning both the fault and punishment. For, 1. All our things, God not enlightening, correcting, and directing us by his Spirit, are evil, and displeasing God. 2. They obtain not their expected and hoped events, or those at leastwise not firm and stable, neither such, wherein sound and solid felicity and blessedness doth consist. 3. That wisdom also, which is the knowledge of Gods will, and a true desire to be obedient thereunto, in this life is joined with manifold errors, sins, and calamities: Therefore humane matters are not ruled of God, that is, working them, as they are confuse, and sins: but are ruled of God permitting sins, even as they are sins, and directing them to most good ends; but working all that is good, even those things which lye hid in things disordered and confuse. Moreover, The evils which just men suffer, and the good which the unjust enjoy, seem disordered in mens judgements: but according to the judgment of God, there is a most just order in them, for those causes which are uttered in the word of God. And those things are to be removed from the will and working of God, not which in our judgement, but which in the judgement of God are disordered. Repl. They who are against God, are not ruled and guided by God.
Be it that it be granted, that things disordered, if they be simply such, are not, or are not ruled of God:1
Devils and wicked men are against God: Therefore they are not ruled and guided by his divine providence. Answ. We grant the whole reason in some respect, namely, that Devils and wicked men are not ruled of God ⟨p. 209⟩by his special providence, that is,1 by his holy Spirit lightning their minds with the knowledge of Gods will, and inclining their hearts not to respect and execute in their actions their own lusts, but the known will of God, and so themselves to work well together with God, who by them worketh well. But they are ruled and governed of God, by his general & secret providence or government, so that they cannot do any thing but what God hath decreed to do by them; and are the instruments of his punishments and benefits, though themselves think and respect some other thing. According to his will he worketh in the army of heaven, 2and in the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, nor say unto him, What doest thou? The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of waters: 3he turneth it whither soever it pleaseth him. God moveth, inclineth,4 and ruleth the wicked will of Josephs brethren in such wise, as not to kill Joseph, but freely to sell him to the Ishmaelites, that by this means he might transport the family of Jacob into Egypt, nourish, & multiply them, and being oppressed by long servitude and bondage, gloriously deliver them. Assur, though a wicked and proud King, yet is called, The rod of the Lords wrath. Likewise, the Assyrians are called, The sanctified of God, hired soldiers, 5doing service to God: whom yet their own ambition, cruelty and covetousness carried, to take weapons against the Jews. Likewise, every-where in Scripture God is said to infatuate and besot the wicked, to strike them with a giddiness, to mad and amaze them, to effeminate them, to fill them full of fear, so that their spirits fail them at the noise of the falling of a leaf: to rule the swords of the wicked with his hand, to obdurate and harden their hearts. By these and the like it is manifest, that even the deliberations, counsels, and actions of the wicked, are subject to his divine providence and government: and that it is not an idle permission in them, but an effectual working of God, inclining their wills, and guiding their actions at his good pleasure.
Object. 1. All the actions and motions of all creatures are done by the will and working of God. Many actions (as the selling of Joseph, the Assyrians warring against the Jews) are sins: Therefore sins are done by the will and working of God, and by force of consequent, the opinion of universal providence maketh God the author of sin. Ans. There is a fallacy of the accident in the Minor proposition. Actions are sins, 1not in themselves, and as they are actions, but by an accident, by reason of the corruption of the instrument in those actions, which God worketh most justly by him, he not respecting this, as to obey therein the known will of God. This corruption or defect of the creature, and the action which God worketh by the creature, concur together by an accident. For neither is essential to other, neither the cause of other, but each is to other accidentary. For both God would have wrought that self same punishment, which he inflicted justly on the Jews by the Assyrians sinning, by an instrument not sinning: and the Assyrian, if it had pleased God to correct his will, might gave been notwithstanding the instrument of Gods wrath, and yet good, how great soever severity he had exercised toward the Jews: As when God by his good Angels slayeth the wicked host of the Assyrians. Sin therefore, which is in the actions of the creature, is not done by the will and working of God, but by an accident, to wit, as God willeth and worketh those actions, which are sins by the fault of the creature. The sum of all cometh to this: The good action of God, exercised by an evil and corrupt instrument, is no otherwise the sin of the bad instrument, than water which cometh pure out of the fountain, is made impure, running through unclean places: or the best wine coming out of a good vessel, waxeth sour and eager, being put in a corrupt vessel, according to that of Horace, Unless the vessel be pure, 2whatsoever thou pourest in, soureth: or further, than the good work of a good Judge, is the evil work of an evil servant or minister: or the riding of a good horse-man, is the halting of a lame horse. In all these is a Paralogism or fallacy of the accident: that is, there is a proceeding from the essence or thing it self, to that which is but an accident to the thing, and doth but by an accident concur with it:
OBject. 1. All the actions and motions of all creatures are done by the will and working of God. Many actions (as the selling of Joseph, the Assyrians warring against the Jewes) are sinnes: Therefore sinnes are done by the will and working of God, and by force of consequent, the opinion of universall providence maketh God the authour of sin. Ans. There is a fallacy of the accident in the Minor proposition. Actions are sinnes,
after this manner, The going ⟨p. 210⟩of a lame horse is a plain halting. The horse-man willeth and worketh the going of the lame horse: Therefore he willeth and worketh the halting. In like sort, the Devil is created and sustained by God. The Devil is wicked: Therefore the wickedness of the Devil is from God, as the author and effecter thereof. Both which reasons are alike sophistical and false.
after this manner, The going ⟨p. 210⟩of a lame horse is a plaine halting. The horse-man willeth and worketh the going of the lame horse: Therfore he willeth and worketh the halting. In like sort, the Divel is created and sustained by God. The Divel is wicked: Therefore the wickednes of the Divel is from God, as the author and effecter thereof. Both which reasons are alike sophisticall and false.
1Repl. 1. Those things which are in their own kind sins, or unto which the definition of sin agreeth, they are in themselves sins. Many actions are in their own kind sins, as theft, lying, adultery, murder: Therefore they are sins in themselves. Ans. It is a fallacy, reasoning from that which is in some respect so, to that which is simply so. For, the whole argument is granted concerning actions prohibited by God, in respect of the creatures, as they are committed of them against the law of God known unto them, either by general or special commandment, or they are not done to that end principally, as thereby to do and execute the known will of God. The reason thereof is certain, and express in the Scriptures; because the will of God, revealed in his word, is the only and surest rule of goodness and rightness in the creatures. Wherefore, if those motions and actions accord to the will of God, they are in themselves good and pleasing to God: but those actions which disagree from his will, are in themselves sins, which God abhorreth and punisheth. Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: that is,2 whatsoever resteth not on the certain commandment of God, neither is done to that end,3 as thereby to obey the known will of God. But the argument on the other side is false, if we respect the will of God moving and working all the motions and actions of all creatures. The reason is, for that God alone by his own nature can will, appoint, or do nothing that is unjust, whether he work by the good, or by the wicked: Because seeing he is most good, his will only is the rule of justice: and seeing he oweth nothing to any man, he cannot to any man be injurious. Wherefore to spoil another against the law and commandment of God, is sin in it self, and theft. But God commanding, by an especial commandment, the Israelites to spoil the Egyptians, it was not theft, but a work good in it self, both in respect of God,4 by this means punishing the unjustice of the Egyptians: as also of the Israelites doing it to this end, that they might obey therein the special will and commandment of God: which if they had done without this commandment, they had committed theft.
Repl. 2. He that willeth and worketh an action, which is in it self sin, willeth and worketh sins: 1God willeth those actions, which in themselves are horrible sins; as are the heinous offences of Absalom, the lying of the Prophets, the cruelty of the Assyrians making waste of Jury: Therefore God willeth and worketh sin. Answ. The Major is true of one, who worketh an action which is sin, and disagreeth from the law of God in respect of his will, 2who worketh it; and is not true of others: but the Assyrians actions, and of others fining, which God effectually would, were sins, not in respect of the will of God, but of the will of the men themselves sinning: For, though God would the same thing; yet he would it not in the same sort that they. But that this answer, as also the former, may be the better understood, & may be with greater certainty opposed against the like sophisms, which humane reason in great number frowardly wresteth against Gods providence, this general rule is to be observed, the truth whereof is manifest, and the use great in Philosophy, both Natural, and Moral, as also in Divinity. One and the same work or action, 3or effect in subject or matter, is in consideration, manner, and form made most diverse, good and bad, according to the diversity of the causes both efficient and final. For, in consideration and respect of a good cause, it is good: in respect of a bad cause, bad: and a good cause is in it self a cause of good; by an accident a cause, of an evil and bad effect, or vice, which is inherent and remaining in the effect, by reason of a bad and vicious cause, concurring in the producing of that effect: and contrary, a bad and evil cause is in it self a cause of evil; but by an accident, of good: which good is in the effect, by reason of a good cause concurring there-with to the producing of that effect. Now then, whatsoever God doth, cannot be but most good, and most just: seeing both himself is most good, and hath no scope or ends of his counsels and works, but such as are most good, always agreeing with his nature and Law: namely, his glory, and the safety ⟨p. 211⟩and salvation of his chosen. But the creatures action is then good, when both themselves are good, and have a good end proposed unto them of their action:
which end they have, when as they execute the commandment of God either general or specials being moved by the cogitation of his commandment, whether they have, or have not any knowledge of the counsel and purpose of God, why he commandeth this or that thing to be done. And the action of creatures is evil, when hoth themselves are evil, as also when, being forsaken and not corrected by God, they do a thing without his commandment, or not to that end; as thereby to obey him. Wherefore that work, the working and doing whereof is ascribed by the Scripture both to God and to a corrupt and evil creature, must needs be good, in respect of God; and evil, in respect of the creature: neither what is evil in that work, may be attributed to God; neither what is good, unto the corrupt creature, but by an accident. So the afflicting or wasting of the Jews was in subject and matter one and the same work, which both God would, ordained, and wrought; and the Assyrians executed: yet in consideration and respect, it was not the same, but most diverse. For, in respect of God, purposing by this means to punish the sins of the Jews, it was the power and most holy work of God: in respect of the Assyrians, who were both wicked, cruel, ravenous, and bent not upon the will of God, which they were ignorant of, but on the fulfilling of their whole rapacity and hatred against the law of God, it was wicked robbery, the proper work of the Assyrians (as it is expressly showed, Isaiah 10.7.) which God neither would nor intended, nor wrought in the Assyrians. Wherefore neither the proper work of the Assyrians, can be attributed to God, nor the proper work of God unto the Assyrians, but by an accident; because namely in one and the same loss and waste which God brought upon the Jews by the Assyrians, the unjust work of the Assyrians did, by an accident, concur with the most just work of God. Even as a Judge is not therefore made a thief, nor a thief made a Judge, because a just Judge putteth to death a robber by an evil executioner, and a thief; but one and the same slaughter is a just punishment, in respect of the Judge; and murder, in respect of the executioner being a thief. So a Captain lawfully waging war, and laying waste the country of his enemies, doth well: but the wicked soldiers, who fulfil therein, and follow their own lusts, sin.
which end they have, when as they execute the commandement of God either generall or specialls being moved by the cogitation of his commandement, whether they have, or have not any knowledge of the counsell and purpose of God, why he commandeth this or that thing to be done. And the action of creatures is evill, when hoth themselves are evill, as also when, being forsaken and not corrected by God, they doe a thing without his commandement, or not to that end; as thereby to obey him. Wherefore that worke, the working and doing whereof is ascribed by the Scripture both to God and to a corrupt and evill creature, must needs be good, in respect of God; and evill, in respect of the creature: neither what is evill in that worke, may be attributed to God; neither what is good, unto the corrupt creature, but by an accident. So the afflicting or wasting of the Jewes was in subject and matter one and the same worke, which both God would, ordayned, and wrought; and the Assyrians executed: yet in consideration and respect, it was not the same, but most diverse. For, in respect of God, purposing by this meanes to punish the sins of the Jewes, it was the power and most holy worke of God: in respect of the Assyrians, who were both wicked, cruell, ravenous, and bent not upon the will of God, which they were ignorant of, but on the fulfilling of their whole rapacity and hatred against the law of God, it was wicked robbery, the proper work of the Assyrians (as it is expresly shewed, Esay 10.7.) which God neither would nor intended, nor wrought in the Assyrians. Wherefore neither the proper worke of the Assyrians, can be attributed to God, nor the proper worke of God unto the Assyrians, but by an accident; because namely in one and the same losse and waste which God brought upon the Jewes by the Assyrians, the unjust worke of the Assyrians did, by an accident, concurre with the most just worke of God. Even as a Judge is not therefore made a thiefe, nor a thiefe made a Judge, because a just Judge putteth to death a robber by an evill executioner, and a thiefe; but one and the same slaughter is a just punishment, in respect of the Judge; and murther, in respect of the executioner being a thiefe. So a Captaine lawfully waging warre, and laying waste the country of his enemies, doth well: but the wicked souldiers, who fulfill therein, and follow their owne lusts, sinne.
So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satan and the Chaldeans, spoiling and vexing him, for to fulfil their own lusts, and to destroy him, do wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.
So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satha• and the Caldeans, spoyling and vexing him, for to fulfill their owne lusts, and to destroy him, doe wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.
1Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not only evils of pain and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denied: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or we may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtful meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and work it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sin then is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and work sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sin, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concur in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy work; while he indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himself will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.
1Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not onely evils of paine and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denyed: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or wee may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtfull meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and worke it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sinthen is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and worke sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sinne, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concurre in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy worke; while hee indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himselfe will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.
1Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightness, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sin is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are four terms in this Syllogism: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keep the creature in that goodness, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This work of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and laws: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightness, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation cometh from God, as it is a punishment; and cometh not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.
1Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightnesse, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sinne is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are foure termes in this Syllogisrne: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keepe the creature in that goodnesse, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This worke of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and lawes: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightnesse, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation commeth from God, as it is a punishment; and commeth not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.
1Obj. 2. When a creature is said to be ruled of God, it is meant, that his actions are from God, and are directed to the glory of God, and the safety of his chosen: But the creatures, even when they sin, are ruled of God. Therefore sins are wrought by God. Ans. The conclusion pulleth in more, than was in the premisses. For this only followeth of them: therefore the actions also of sinners, as they are actions (that is, as they are not sins; but motions wrought by God) are from God, and are ruled of him. For he will the actions: but the pravity and naughtiness of the action, which is from men, he will not. Moreover, God through his great goodness ruleth and guideth sins also, as they are sins: yet not by working them, but by permitting them, and destining and directing them to certain ends, and those most good.
1Obj. 2. When a creature is said to be ruled of God, it is meant, that his actions are from God, and are directed to the glory of God, and the safety of his chosen: But the creatures, even when they sin, are ruled of God. Therefore sins are wrought by God. Ans. The conclusion pulleth in more, than was in the premisses. For this only followeth of them: therefore the actions also of sinners, as they are actions (that is, as they are not sins; but motions wrought by God) are from God, and are ruled of him. For he will the actions: but the pravity and naughtinesse of the action, which is from men, he will not. Moreover, God through his great goodnesse ruleth and guideth sins also, as they are sins: yet not by working them, but by permitting them, and destining and directing them to certain ends, and those most good.
Divels and wicked men are against God: Therefore they are not ruled and guided by his divine providence. Answ. Wee grant the whole reason in some respect, namely, that Divels and wicked men are not ruled of God ⟨p. 209⟩by his speciall providence, that is,1 by his holy Spirit lightning their mindes with the knowledge of Gods will, and inclining their hearts not to respect and execute in their actions their owne lusts, but the knowne will of God, and so themselves to worke well together with God, who by them worketh well. But they are ruled and governed of God, by his generall & secret providence or government, so that they cannot doe any thing but what God hath decreed to doe by them; and are the instruments of his punishments and benefits, though themselves thinke and respect some other thing. According to his will he worketh in the army of heaven, 2and in the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, nor say unto him, What doest thou? The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of waters: 3he turneth it whither soever it pleaseth him. God moveth, inclineth,4 and ruleth the wicked wil of Josephs brethren in such wise, as not to kill Joseph, but freely to sell him to the Ismaelites, that by this means he might transport the family of Jacob into Egypt, nourish, & multiply them, and being oppressed by long servitude and bondage, gloriously deliver them. Assur, though a wicked and proud King, yet is called, The rod of the Lords wrath. Likewise, the Assyrians are called, The sanctified of God, hired souldiers, 5doing service to God: whom yet their own ambition, cruelty and coveteousnesse carried, to take weapons against the Jewes. Likewise, every-where in Scripture God is said to infatuate and besot the wicked, to strike them with a giddinesse, to mad and amase them, to effeminate them, to fill them full of feare, so that their spirits faile them at the noise of the falling of a leafe: to rule the swords of the wickedwith his hand, to obdurate and harden their hearts. By these and the like it is manifest, that even the deliberations, counsels, and actions of the wicked, are subject to his divine providence and government: and that it is not an idle permission in them, but an effectuall working of God, inclining their wils, and guiding their actions at his good pleasure.
Repl. 2. He that willeth and worketh an action, which is in it selfe sin, willeth and worketh sins: 1God willeth those actions, which in themselves are horrible sinnes; as are the hainous offences of Absolon, the lying of the Prophets, the cruelty of the Assyrians making waste of Jury: Therefore God willeth and worketh sin. Answ. The Major is true of one, who worketh an action which is sin, and disagreeth from the law of God in respect of his will, 2who worketh it; and is not true of others: but the Assyrians actions, and of others finning, which God effectually would, were sins, not in respect of the will of God, but of the will of the men themselves sinning: For, though God would the same thing; yet he would it not in the same sort that they. But that this answer, as also the former, may be the better understood, & may be with greater certainty opposed against the like sophisms, which humane reason in great number frowardly wresteth against Gods providence, this generall rule is to be observed, the truth whereof is manifest, and the use great in Philosophy, both Naturall, and Morall, as also in Divinity. One and the same worke or action, 3or effect in subject or matter, is in consideration, manner, and forme made most diverse, good and bad, according to the diversity of the causes both efficient and finall. For, in consideration and respect of a good cause, it is good: in respect of a bad cause, bad: and a good cause is in it self a cause of good; by an accident a cause, of an evill and bad effect, or vice, which is inherent and remaining in the effect, by reason of a bad and vicious cause, concurring in the producing of that effect: and contrary, a bad and evil cause is in it self a cause of evill; but by an accident, of good: which good is in the effect, by reason of a good cause concurring there-with to the producing of that effect. Now then, whatsoever God doth, cannot be but most good, and most just: seeing both himselfe is most good, and hath no scope or ends of his counsels and works, but such as are most good, alwaies agreeing with his nature and Law: namely, his glory, and the safety ⟨p. 211⟩and salvation of his chosen. But the creatures action is then good, when both themselves are good, and have a good end proposed unto them of their action: