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The sum of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinity / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latin edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professor of Divinity in Heidelberg ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabetical table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversy, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theological miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errors of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the original Latin copy by A.R.The summe of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinitie / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latine edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professour of Divinity in Heidelberge ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabeticall table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversie, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theologicall miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errours of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the originall Latine copie by A.R.
London: printed by James Young, 1645
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Object. 1. All the actions and motions of all creatures are done by the will and working of God. Many actions (as the selling of Joseph, the Assyrians warring against the Jews) are sins: Therefore sins are done by the will and working of God, and by force of consequent, the opinion of universal providence maketh God the author of sin. Ans. There is a fallacy of the accident in the Minor proposition. Actions are sins, 1not in themselves, and as they are actions, but by an accident, by reason of the corruption of the instrument in those actions, which God worketh most justly by him, he not respecting this, as to obey therein the known will of God. This corruption or defect of the creature, and the action which God worketh by the creature, concur together by an accident. For neither is essential to other, neither the cause of other, but each is to other accidentary. For both God would have wrought that self same punishment, which he inflicted justly on the Jews by the Assyrians sinning, by an instrument not sinning: and the Assyrian, if it had pleased God to correct his will, might gave been notwithstanding the instrument of Gods wrath, and yet good, how great soever severity he had exercised toward the Jews: As when God by his good Angels slayeth the wicked host of the Assyrians. Sin therefore, which is in the actions of the creature, is not done by the will and working of God, but by an accident, to wit, as God willeth and worketh those actions, which are sins by the fault of the creature. The sum of all cometh to this: The good action of God, exercised by an evil and corrupt instrument, is no otherwise the sin of the bad instrument, than water which cometh pure out of the fountain, is made impure, running through unclean places: or the best wine coming out of a good vessel, waxeth sour and eager, being put in a corrupt vessel, according to that of Horace, Unless the vessel be pure, 2whatsoever thou pourest in, soureth: or further, than the good work of a good Judge, is the evil work of an evil servant or minister: or the riding of a good horse-man, is the halting of a lame horse. In all these is a Paralogism or fallacy of the accident: that is, there is a proceeding from the essence or thing it self, to that which is but an accident to the thing, and doth but by an accident concur with it:
OBject. 1. All the actions and motions of all creatures are done by the will and working of God. Many actions (as the selling of Joseph, the Assyrians warring against the Jewes) are sinnes: Therefore sinnes are done by the will and working of God, and by force of consequent, the opinion of universall providence maketh God the authour of sin. Ans. There is a fallacy of the accident in the Minor proposition. Actions are sinnes, 1not in themselves, and as they are actions, but by an accident, by reason of the corruption of the instrument in those actions, which God worketh most justly by him, he not respecting this, as to obey therein the known will of God. This corruption or defect of the creature, and the action which God worketh by the creature, concurre together by an accident. For neither is essentiall to other, neither the cause of other, but each is to other accidentary. For both God would have wrought that selfe same punishment, which he inflicted justly on the Jewes by the Assyrians sinning, by an instrument not sinning: and the Assyrian, if it had pleased God to correct his will, might gave been notwithstanding the instrument of Gods wrath, and yet good, how great soever severity he had exercised toward the Jewes: As when God by his good Angels slayeth the wicked hoast of the Assyrians. Sin therefore, which is in the actions of the creature, is not done by the will and working of God, but by an accident, to wit, as God willeth and worketh those actions, which are sins by the fault of the creature. The summe of all cometh to this: The good action of God, exercised by an evill and corrupt instrument, is no otherwise the sinne of the bad instrument, than water which cometh pure out of the fountaine, is made impure, running through uncleane places: or the best wine coming out of a good vessell, wexeth sowre and eager, being put in a corrupt vessell, according to that of Horace, Ʋnlesse the vessell bee pure, 2whatsoever thou powrest in, sowreth: or further, than the good worke of a good Judge, is the evill worke of an evill servant or minister: or the riding of a good horse-man, is the halting of a lame horse. In all these is a Paralogisme or fallacy of the accident: that is, there is a proceeding from the essence or thing it selfe, to that which is but an accident to the thing, and doth but by an accident concurre with it:
after this manner, The going ⟨p. 210⟩of a lame horse is a plain halting. The horse-man willeth and worketh the going of the lame horse: Therefore he willeth and worketh the halting. In like sort, the Devil is created and sustained by God. The Devil is wicked: Therefore the wickedness of the Devil is from God, as the author and effecter thereof. Both which reasons are alike sophistical and false.
after this manner, The going ⟨p. 210⟩of a lame horse is a plaine halting. The horse-man willeth and worketh the going of the lame horse: Therfore he willeth and worketh the halting. In like sort, the Divel is created and sustained by God. The Divel is wicked: Therefore the wickednes of the Divel is from God, as the author and effecter thereof. Both which reasons are alike sophisticall and false.
1Repl. 1. Those things which are in their own kind sins, or unto which the definition of sin agreeth, they are in themselves sins. Many actions are in their own kind sins, as theft, lying, adultery, murder: Therefore they are sins in themselves. Ans. It is a fallacy, reasoning from that which is in some respect so, to that which is simply so. For, the whole argument is granted concerning actions prohibited by God, in respect of the creatures, as they are committed of them against the law of God known unto them, either by general or special commandment, or they are not done to that end principally, as thereby to do and execute the known will of God. The reason thereof is certain, and express in the Scriptures; because the will of God, revealed in his word, is the only and surest rule of goodness and rightness in the creatures. Wherefore, if those motions and actions accord to the will of God, they are in themselves good and pleasing to God: but those actions which disagree from his will, are in themselves sins, which God abhorreth and punisheth. Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: that is,2 whatsoever resteth not on the certain commandment of God, neither is done to that end,3 as thereby to obey the known will of God. But the argument on the other side is false, if we respect the will of God moving and working all the motions and actions of all creatures. The reason is, for that God alone by his own nature can will, appoint, or do nothing that is unjust, whether he work by the good, or by the wicked: Because seeing he is most good, his will only is the rule of justice: and seeing he oweth nothing to any man, he cannot to any man be injurious. Wherefore to spoil another against the law and commandment of God, is sin in it self, and theft. But God commanding, by an especial commandment, the Israelites to spoil the Egyptians, it was not theft, but a work good in it self, both in respect of God,4 by this means punishing the unjustice of the Egyptians: as also of the Israelites doing it to this end, that they might obey therein the special will and commandment of God: which if they had done without this commandment, they had committed theft.
Repl. 2. He that willeth and worketh an action, which is in it self sin, willeth and worketh sins: 1God willeth those actions, which in themselves are horrible sins; as are the heinous offences of Absalom, the lying of the Prophets, the cruelty of the Assyrians making waste of Jury: Therefore God willeth and worketh sin. Answ. The Major is true of one, who worketh an action which is sin, and disagreeth from the law of God in respect of his will, 2who worketh it; and is not true of others: but the Assyrians actions, and of others fining, which God effectually would, were sins, not in respect of the will of God, but of the will of the men themselves sinning: For, though God would the same thing; yet he would it not in the same sort that they. But that this answer, as also the former, may be the better understood, & may be with greater certainty opposed against the like sophisms, which humane reason in great number frowardly wresteth against Gods providence, this general rule is to be observed, the truth whereof is manifest, and the use great in Philosophy, both Natural, and Moral, as also in Divinity. One and the same work or action, 3or effect in subject or matter, is in consideration, manner, and form made most diverse, good and bad, according to the diversity of the causes both efficient and final. For, in consideration and respect of a good cause, it is good: in respect of a bad cause, bad: and a good cause is in it self a cause of good; by an accident a cause, of an evil and bad effect, or vice, which is inherent and remaining in the effect, by reason of a bad and vicious cause, concurring in the producing of that effect: and contrary, a bad and evil cause is in it self a cause of evil; but by an accident, of good: which good is in the effect, by reason of a good cause concurring there-with to the producing of that effect. Now then, whatsoever God doth, cannot be but most good, and most just: seeing both himself is most good, and hath no scope or ends of his counsels and works, but such as are most good, always agreeing with his nature and Law: namely, his glory, and the safety
which end they have, when as they execute the commandment of God either general or specials being moved by the cogitation of his commandment, whether they have, or have not any knowledge of the counsel and purpose of God, why he commandeth this or that thing to be done. And the action of creatures is evil, when hoth themselves are evil, as also when, being forsaken and not corrected by God, they do a thing without his commandment, or not to that end; as thereby to obey him. Wherefore that work, the working and doing whereof is ascribed by the Scripture both to God and to a corrupt and evil creature, must needs be good, in respect of God; and evil, in respect of the creature: neither what is evil in that work, may be attributed to God; neither what is good, unto the corrupt creature, but by an accident. So the afflicting or wasting of the Jews was in subject and matter one and the same work, which both God would, ordained, and wrought; and the Assyrians executed: yet in consideration and respect, it was not the same, but most diverse. For, in respect of God, purposing by this means to punish the sins of the Jews, it was the power and most holy work of God: in respect of the Assyrians, who were both wicked, cruel, ravenous, and bent not upon the will of God, which they were ignorant of, but on the fulfilling of their whole rapacity and hatred against the law of God, it was wicked robbery, the proper work of the Assyrians (as it is expressly showed, Isaiah 10.7.) which God neither would nor intended, nor wrought in the Assyrians. Wherefore neither the proper work of the Assyrians, can be attributed to God, nor the proper work of God unto the Assyrians, but by an accident; because namely in one and the same loss and waste which God brought upon the Jews by the Assyrians, the unjust work of the Assyrians did, by an accident, concur with the most just work of God. Even as a Judge is not therefore made a thief, nor a thief made a Judge, because a just Judge putteth to death a robber by an evil executioner, and a thief; but one and the same slaughter is a just punishment, in respect of the Judge; and murder, in respect of the executioner being a thief. So a Captain lawfully waging war, and laying waste the country of his enemies, doth well: but the wicked soldiers, who fulfil therein, and follow their own lusts, sin.
which end they have, when as they execute the commandement of God either generall or specialls being moved by the cogitation of his commandement, whether they have, or have not any knowledge of the counsell and purpose of God, why he commandeth this or that thing to be done. And the action of creatures is evill, when hoth themselves are evill, as also when, being forsaken and not corrected by God, they doe a thing without his commandement, or not to that end; as thereby to obey him. Wherefore that worke, the working and doing whereof is ascribed by the Scripture both to God and to a corrupt and evill creature, must needs be good, in respect of God; and evill, in respect of the creature: neither what is evill in that worke, may be attributed to God; neither what is good, unto the corrupt creature, but by an accident. So the afflicting or wasting of the Jewes was in subject and matter one and the same worke, which both God would, ordayned, and wrought; and the Assyrians executed: yet in consideration and respect, it was not the same, but most diverse. For, in respect of God, purposing by this meanes to punish the sins of the Jewes, it was the power and most holy worke of God: in respect of the Assyrians, who were both wicked, cruell, ravenous, and bent not upon the will of God, which they were ignorant of, but on the fulfilling of their whole rapacity and hatred against the law of God, it was wicked robbery, the proper work of the Assyrians (as it is expresly shewed, Esay 10.7.) which God neither would nor intended, nor wrought in the Assyrians. Wherefore neither the proper worke of the Assyrians, can be attributed to God, nor the proper worke of God unto the Assyrians, but by an accident; because namely in one and the same losse and waste which God brought upon the Jewes by the Assyrians, the unjust worke of the Assyrians did, by an accident, concurre with the most just worke of God. Even as a Judge is not therefore made a thiefe, nor a thiefe made a Judge, because a just Judge putteth to death a robber by an evill executioner, and a thiefe; but one and the same slaughter is a just punishment, in respect of the Judge; and murther, in respect of the executioner being a thiefe. So a Captaine lawfully waging warre, and laying waste the country of his enemies, doth well: but the wicked souldiers, who fulfill therein, and follow their owne lusts, sinne.
So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satan and the Chaldeans, spoiling and vexing him, for to fulfil their own lusts, and to destroy him, do wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.
So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satha• and the Caldeans, spoyling and vexing him, for to fulfill their owne lusts, and to destroy him, doe wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.
1Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not only evils of pain and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denied: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or we may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtful meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and work it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sin then is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and work sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sin, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concur in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy work; while he indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himself will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.
1Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not onely evils of paine and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denyed: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or wee may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtfull meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and worke it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sinthen is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and worke sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sinne, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concurre in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy worke; while hee indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himselfe will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.
1Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightness, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sin is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are four terms in this Syllogism: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keep the creature in that goodness, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This work of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and laws: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightness, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation cometh from God, as it is a punishment; and cometh not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.
1Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightnesse, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sinne is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are foure termes in this Syllogisrne: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keepe the creature in that goodnesse, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This worke of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and lawes: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightnesse, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation commeth from God, as it is a punishment; and commeth not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.
1Obj. 2. When a creature is said to be ruled of God, it is meant, that his actions are from God, and are directed to the glory of God, and the safety of his chosen: But the creatures, even when they sin, are ruled of God. Therefore sins are wrought by God. Ans. The conclusion pulleth in more, than was in the premisses. For this only followeth of them: therefore the actions also of sinners, as they are actions (that is, as they are not sins; but motions wrought by God) are from God, and are ruled of him. For he will the actions: but the pravity and naughtiness of the action, which is from men, he will not. Moreover, God through his great goodness ruleth and guideth sins also, as they are sins: yet not by working them, but by permitting them, and destining and directing them to certain ends, and those most good.
1Obj. 2. When a creature is said to be ruled of God, it is meant, that his actions are from God, and are directed to the glory of God, and the safety of his chosen: But the creatures, even when they sin, are ruled of God. Therefore sins are wrought by God. Ans. The conclusion pulleth in more, than was in the premisses. For this only followeth of them: therefore the actions also of sinners, as they are actions (that is, as they are not sins; but motions wrought by God) are from God, and are ruled of him. For he will the actions: but the pravity and naughtinesse of the action, which is from men, he will not. Moreover, God through his great goodnesse ruleth and guideth sins also, as they are sins: yet not by working them, but by permitting them, and destining and directing them to certain ends, and those most good.
Obj. 3. Of those things which are done by Gods providence, God himself is author and efficient. But all evils, even of crime and offence, are done by the providence of God. Therefore God is author of all that is evil. Ans. The Major is to be distinguished: Those things which are done by Gods providence, that is, Gods providence working them, or are done as proceeding from it, God worketh them. But all evil things are done by Gods providence; yet not all alike. Evils of punishment, because they have in them […] respect and consideration of good, are done as proceeding from the providence of God: for God hath from everlasting decreed them, and in time, order, and manner determined by him, worketh them. Evils of crime, or sins, as they are such, are not done as from or of the providence of God, but according unto the providence of God; that is, they are done by the providence of God, not working them, but permitting, determining, and directing them to most good ends, and most agreeable to his nature and law. For evils of crime, or sins as they are such, have not a respect & consideration of good in them, as evils of punishments have. Therefore God did not decree or will to work them, but he decreed to permit them, and not to hinder them from being done by others, and from concurring in actions with the holy and sacred work of God, partly to exercise his justice in punishing some, and partly to declare his mercy in forgiving others.
Obj. 3. Of those things which are done by Gods providence, God himself is author and efficient. But all evils, even of crime and offence, are done by the providence of God. Therefore God is author of all that is evill. Ans. The Major is to be distinguished: Those things which are done by Gods providence, that is, Gods providence working them, or are done as proceeding from it, God worketh them. But all evill things are done by Gods providence; yet not all alike. Evils of punishment, because they have in them 〈…〉 respect and consideration of good, are done as proceeding from the providence of God: for God hath from everlasting decreed them, and in time, order, and manner determined by him, worketh them. Evils of crime, or sins, as they are such, are not done as from or of the providence of God, but according unto the providence of God; that is, they are done by the providence of God, not working them, but permitting, determining, and directing them to most good ends, and most agreeable to his nature and law. For evils of crime, or sins as they are such, have not a respect & consideration of good in them, as evils of punishments have. Therefore God did not decree or will to worke them, but he decreed to permit them, and not to hinder them from being done by others, and from concurring in actions with the holy and sacred work of God, partly to exercise his justice in punishing some, and partly to declare his mercy in forgiving others.
He that in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, hath in him contradictory & flat repugnant wills: But God in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, as robberies, spoils, rapes, murders: Therefore he hath contradictory wills. Ans. I. We grant the whole argument, if therein be meant these evil actions in such sort as they are committed against the Law by the creatures, and so become sins. For in this sense God neither willeth them, nor alloweth of them, but only as they are certain motions, and punishments of sin.Answ. 2. The Major is to be distinguished: He contradicteth, or is contrary to himself, who will and will not the same work, that is, in the same manner and respect: God will and will not the same, but in a diverse manner and respect. He will and worketh it, as ⟨p. 213⟩it is a motion and action, and also a punishment of sin, or any thing agreeing with his Law and justice, as a trial, or exercise, or martyrdom of the godly. He willeth not, neither alloweth or commandeth, nor worketh any thing, as by reason of the corruption of the instrument, by which he exerciseth his work: it swerveth from his divine justice and law. Now in a divers manner and respect, to will, and not to will the same, and yet to determine on that part, whereof the reasons seem strongest, is not in us, much less in God, absurd or repugnant. The waste of Israel, which the Assyrians wrought, God willeth as a punishment, which his justice of right did require: he willeth it not, but condemneth, and afterwards most grievously revengeth it in the Assyrians, inasmuch, as it was not the execution of Gods wrath, but a fulfilling of their own wrath and lusts against his law. So God willeth, that all should obey his word and be saved: 1. In respect of his love towards all: for he is delighted with the death of no man. 12. In respect of his commandment, and inviting of all to repentance. But he will not that all be converted and so be saved, in respect of his working or efficacy: that is, he commandeth all men indeed to repent and believe, and promiseth life to all that believe; but he doth not any where promise that he will work by his spirit in all, that they should believe and be saved.
HEe that in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, hath in him contradictory & flat repugnant wils: But God in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, as robberies, spoyles, rapes, murthers: Therefore he hath contradictory wils. Ans. I. We grant the whole argument, if therein bee meant these evill actions in such sort as they are committed against the Law by the creatures, and so become sinnes. For in this sense God neither willeth them, nor alloweth of them, but onely as they are certaine motions, and punishments of sinne.Answ. 2. The Major is to be distinguished: He contradicteth, or is contrary to himselfe, who will and will not the same work, that is, in the same manner and respect: God will and will not the same, but in a diverse manner and respect. Hee will and worketh it, as
For if he would this, it must needs be, that either all should obey Gods commandments and be saved, or that God should not be omnipotent. Repl. If God willeth one thing in signification, or by his commandment, and willeth effectually, or by his efficacy and working, another; he shall be changeable and a dissembler. Answ. This doth not thereof follow.1 For even when he willeth effectually those actions which are sins, he doth indeed detest them, as they are sins: and when he commandeth obedience, he doth in earnest exact it of all. But this will of signification, or commandment of God, doth not testify, or declare, what he will work in all; but what agreeth with his mind, what he alloweth, what he requireth, and what every one oweth unto him. God therefore dissembleth not, neither is contrary to himself: because he doth not in all places, nor at all times manifest his will unto his creatures: and his will of punishing is not disagreeing from his law.
For if he would this, it must needs be, that either all should obey Gods commandements and be saved, or that God should not be omnipotent. Repl. If God willeth one thing in signification, or by his commandement, and willeth effectually, or by his efficacy and working, another; he shall be changeable and a dissembler. Answ. This doth not thereof follow.1 For even when he willeth effectually those actions which are sins, he doth indeed detest them, as they are sins: and when he commandeth obedience, he doth in earnest exact it of all. But this will of signification, or commandement of God, doth not testifie, or declare, what he will work in all; but what agreeth with his mind, what he alloweth, what he requireth, and what every one oweth unto him. God therefore dissembleth not, neither is contrary to himself: because he doth not in all places, nor at all times manifest his will unto his creatures: and his will of punishing is not disagreeing from his law.
1That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsel, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and nearest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes always working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not always working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Soldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to do either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wills of the Soldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would choose the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeableness of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditional, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freeness of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accomplisheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and showed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion choose or refuse that which ⟨p. 214⟩seemed good from everlasting to God, and was decreed of him. For, if when God worketh well by evil creatures, there is not taken away in them, through the decree or providence of God, and his good working, that which is accidental to them, that is, corruption:
1THat which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsell, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and neerest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes alwaies working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not alwaies working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Souldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to doe either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wils of the Souldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would chuse the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeablenesse of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditionall, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freenesse of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accompisheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and shewed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion chuse or refuse that which
how much less shall that be taken away, which is essential unto them, even to work freely? So the blessed Angels are changeably good, as concerning their nature: but they are unchangeably and necessarily only good, according to Gods decree and directing of them; and yet freely: so that how much the more effectually they are moved by the Spirit of God, so much the more freely, and with greater alacrity and propension they will, and do only that which is good. Judas, the Jews, Herod, Pilate, the Soldiers delivered and crucified Christ freely,1 and with great willingness and pleasure, and yet they did whatsoever the hand and counsel of God had determined before to be done.
how much lesse shall that be taken away, which is essentiall unto them, even to work freely? So the blessed Angels are changeably good, as concerning their nature: but they are unchangeably and necessarily only good, according to Gods decree and directing of them; and yet freely: so that how much the more effectually they are moved by the Spirit of God, so much the more freely, and with greater alacrity and propension they will, and doe onely that which is good. Judas, the Jewes, Herod, Pilate, the Souldiers delivered and crucified Christ freely,1 and with great willingnesse and pleasure, and yet they did whatsoever the hand and counsell of God had determined before to be done.
Repl. 2. He that willeth and worketh an action, which is in it selfe sin, willeth and worketh sins: 1God willeth those actions, which in themselves are horrible sinnes; as are the hainous offences of Absolon, the lying of the Prophets, the cruelty of the Assyrians making waste of Jury: Therefore God willeth and worketh sin. Answ. The Major is true of one, who worketh an action which is sin, and disagreeth from the law of God in respect of his will, 2who worketh it; and is not true of others: but the Assyrians actions, and of others finning, which God effectually would, were sins, not in respect of the will of God, but of the will of the men themselves sinning: For, though God would the same thing; yet he would it not in the same sort that they. But that this answer, as also the former, may be the better understood, & may be with greater certainty opposed against the like sophisms, which humane reason in great number frowardly wresteth against Gods providence, this generall rule is to be observed, the truth whereof is manifest, and the use great in Philosophy, both Naturall, and Morall, as also in Divinity. One and the same worke or action, 3or effect in subject or matter, is in consideration, manner, and forme made most diverse, good and bad, according to the diversity of the causes both efficient and finall. For, in consideration and respect of a good cause, it is good: in respect of a bad cause, bad: and a good cause is in it self a cause of good; by an accident a cause, of an evill and bad effect, or vice, which is inherent and remaining in the effect, by reason of a bad and vicious cause, concurring in the producing of that effect: and contrary, a bad and evil cause is in it self a cause of evill; but by an accident, of good: which good is in the effect, by reason of a good cause concurring there-with to the producing of that effect. Now then, whatsoever God doth, cannot be but most good, and most just: seeing both himselfe is most good, and hath no scope or ends of his counsels and works, but such as are most good, alwaies agreeing with his nature and Law: namely, his glory, and the safety ⟨p. 211⟩and salvation of his chosen. But the creatures action is then good, when both themselves are good, and have a good end proposed unto them of their action:
