The sum of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism,…The summe of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism,…

So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satan and the Chaldeans, spoiling and vexing him, for to fulfil their own lusts, and to destroy him, do wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.

So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satha• and the Caldeans, spoyling and vexing him, for to fulfill their owne lusts, and to destroy him, doe wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.

¹Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not only evils of pain and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denied: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or we may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtful meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and work it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sin then is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and work sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sin, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concur in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy work; while he indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himself will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.

¹Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not onely evils of paine and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denyed: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or wee may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtfull meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and worke it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sinthen is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and worke sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sinne, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concurre in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy worke; while hee indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himselfe will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.

1. 1God doth not will or work sin it self, but only permitteth it.God doth not will or worke sinne it selfe, but onely permitteth it.

¹Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightness, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sin is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are four terms in this Syllogism: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keep the creature in that goodness, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This work of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and laws: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightness, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation cometh from God, as it is a punishment; and cometh not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.

¹Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightnesse, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sinne is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are foure termes in this Syllogisrne: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keepe the creature in that goodnesse, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This worke of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and lawes: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightnesse, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation commeth from God, as it is a punishment; and commeth not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.

1. 1To rule sin is not to work them.To rule sinn is not to work them.

Obj. 3. Of those things which are done by Gods providence, God himself is author and efficient. But all evils, even of crime and offence, are done by the providence of God. Therefore God is author of all that is evil. Ans. The Major is to be distinguished: Those things which are done by Gods providence, that is, Gods providence working them, or are done as proceeding from it, God worketh them. But all evil things are done by Gods providence; yet not all alike. Evils of punishment, because they have in them […] respect and consideration of good, are done as proceeding from the providence of God: for God hath from everlasting decreed them, and in time, order, and manner determined by him, worketh them. Evils of crime, or sins, as they are such, are not done as from or of the providence of God, but according unto the providence of God; that is, they are done by the providence of God, not working them, but permitting, determining, and directing them to most good ends, and most agreeable to his nature and law. For evils of crime, or sins as they are such, have not a respect & consideration of good in them, as evils of punishments have. Therefore God did not decree or will to work them, but he decreed to permit them, and not to hinder them from being done by others, and from concurring in actions with the holy and sacred work of God, partly to exercise his justice in punishing some, and partly to declare his mercy in forgiving others.

Obj. 3. Of those things which are done by Gods providence, God himself is author and efficient. But all evils, even of crime and offence, are done by the providence of God. Therefore God is author of all that is evill. Ans. The Major is to be distinguished: Those things which are done by Gods providence, that is, Gods providence working them, or are done as proceeding from it, God worketh them. But all evill things are done by Gods providence; yet not all alike. Evils of punishment, because they have in them 〈…〉 respect and consideration of good, are done as proceeding from the providence of God: for God hath from everlasting decreed them, and in time, order, and manner determined by him, worketh them. Evils of crime, or sins, as they are such, are not done as from or of the providence of God, but according unto the providence of God; that is, they are done by the providence of God, not working them, but permitting, determining, and directing them to most good ends, and most agreeable to his nature and law. For evils of crime, or sins as they are such, have not a respect & consideration of good in them, as evils of punishments have. Therefore God did not decree or will to worke them, but he decreed to permit them, and not to hinder them from being done by others, and from concurring in actions with the holy and sacred work of God, partly to exercise his justice in punishing some, and partly to declare his mercy in forgiving others.

The third Sophism, of contradictory Wills.

The third Sophisme, of contradictory Wils.

He that in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, hath in him contradictory & flat repugnant wills: But God in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, as robberies, spoils, rapes, murders: Therefore he hath contradictory wills. Ans. I. We grant the whole argument, if therein be meant these evil actions in such sort as they are committed against the Law by the creatures, and so become sins. For in this sense God neither willeth them, nor alloweth of them, but only as they are certain motions, and punishments of sin.Answ. 2. The Major is to be distinguished: He contradicteth, or is contrary to himself, who will and will not the same work, that is, in the same manner and respect: God will and will not the same, but in a diverse manner and respect. He will and worketh it, as ⟨p. 213⟩it is a motion and action, and also a punishment of sin, or any thing agreeing with his Law and justice, as a trial, or exercise, or martyrdom of the godly. He willeth not, neither alloweth or commandeth, nor worketh any thing, as by reason of the corruption of the instrument, by which he exerciseth his work: it swerveth from his divine justice and law. Now in a divers manner and respect, to will, and not to will the same, and yet to determine on that part, whereof the reasons seem strongest, is not in us, much less in God, absurd or repugnant. The waste of Israel, which the Assyrians wrought, God willeth as a punishment, which his justice of right did require: he willeth it not, but condemneth, and afterwards most grievously revengeth it in the Assyrians, inasmuch, as it was not the execution of Gods wrath, but a fulfilling of their own wrath and lusts against his law. So God willeth, that all should obey his word and be saved: 1. In respect of his love towards all: for he is delighted with the death of no man. ¹2. In respect of his commandment, and inviting of all to repentance. But he will not that all be converted and so be saved, in respect of his working or efficacy: that is, he commandeth all men indeed to repent and believe, and promiseth life to all that believe; but he doth not any where promise that he will work by his spirit in all, that they should believe and be saved.

HEe that in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, hath in him contradictory & flat repugnant wils: But God in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, as robberies, spoyles, rapes, murthers: Therefore he hath contradictory wils. Ans. I. We grant the whole argument, if therein bee meant these evill actions in such sort as they are committed against the Law by the creatures, and so become sinnes. For in this sense God neither willeth them, nor alloweth of them, but onely as they are certaine motions, and punishments of sinne.Answ. 2. The Major is to be distinguished: He contradicteth, or is contrary to himselfe, who will and will not the same work, that is, in the same manner and respect: God will and will not the same, but in a diverse manner and respect. Hee will and worketh it, as

For if he would this, it must needs be, that either all should obey Gods commandments and be saved, or that God should not be omnipotent. Repl. If God willeth one thing in signification, or by his commandment, and willeth effectually, or by his efficacy and working, another; he shall be changeable and a dissembler. Answ. This doth not thereof follow.¹ For even when he willeth effectually those actions which are sins, he doth indeed detest them, as they are sins: and when he commandeth obedience, he doth in earnest exact it of all. But this will of signification, or commandment of God, doth not testify, or declare, what he will work in all; but what agreeth with his mind, what he alloweth, what he requireth, and what every one oweth unto him. God therefore dissembleth not, neither is contrary to himself: because he doth not in all places, nor at all times manifest his will unto his creatures: and his will of punishing is not disagreeing from his law.

For if he would this, it must needs be, that either all should obey Gods commandements and be saved, or that God should not be omnipotent. Repl. If God willeth one thing in signification, or by his commandement, and willeth effectually, or by his efficacy and working, another; he shall be changeable and a dissembler. Answ. This doth not thereof follow.¹ For even when he willeth effectually those actions which are sins, he doth indeed detest them, as they are sins: and when he commandeth obedience, he doth in earnest exact it of all. But this will of signification, or commandement of God, doth not testifie, or declare, what he will work in all; but what agreeth with his mind, what he alloweth, what he requireth, and what every one oweth unto him. God therefore dissembleth not, neither is contrary to himself: because he doth not in all places, nor at all times manifest his will unto his creatures: and his will of punishing is not disagreeing from his law.

1. 1God no dissembler.

The fourth Sophism, of contingency and liberty or freeness.

The fourth Sophisme, of contingency and liberty or freenesse.

¹That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsel, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and nearest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes always working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not always working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Soldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to do either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wills of the Soldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would choose the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeableness of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditional, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freeness of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accomplisheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and showed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion choose or refuse that which ⟨p. 214⟩seemed good from everlasting to God, and was decreed of him. For, if when God worketh well by evil creatures, there is not taken away in them, through the decree or providence of God, and his good working, that which is accidental to them, that is, corruption:

¹THat which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsell, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and neerest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes alwaies working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not alwaies working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Souldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to doe either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wils of the Souldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would chuse the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeablenesse of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditionall, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freenesse of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accompisheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and shewed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion chuse or refuse that which

how much less shall that be taken away, which is essential unto them, even to work freely? So the blessed Angels are changeably good, as concerning their nature: but they are unchangeably and necessarily only good, according to Gods decree and directing of them; and yet freely: so that how much the more effectually they are moved by the Spirit of God, so much the more freely, and with greater alacrity and propension they will, and do only that which is good. Judas, the Jews, Herod, Pilate, the Soldiers delivered and crucified Christ freely,¹ and with great willingness and pleasure, and yet they did whatsoever the hand and counsel of God had determined before to be done.

how much lesse shall that be taken away, which is essentiall unto them, even to work freely? So the blessed Angels are changeably good, as concerning their nature: but they are unchangeably and necessarily only good, according to Gods decree and directing of them; and yet freely: so that how much the more effectually they are moved by the Spirit of God, so much the more freely, and with greater alacrity and propension they will, and doe onely that which is good. Judas, the Jewes, Herod, Pilate, the Souldiers delivered and crucified Christ freely,¹ and with great willingnesse and pleasure, and yet they did whatsoever the hand and counsell of God had determined before to be done.

1. 1Acts 5.28.

Object. 2. That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily. All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing is therefore done contingently, neither by Fortune nor Chance, but all necessarily: which is the Stoics doctrine of fate or destiny. Here, before we answer to this objection, we must know the signification of the words, and the difference between the opinion of the Stoics and Christians. Necessarily is that which cannot be otherwise than it is.¹ Contingent is that, which is indeed, or is done, but might notwithstanding not have been, or have been done otherwise. Necessity therefore and contingency is the order which is between the cause and the effect, unchangeable or changeable. And because the effects follow of their causes unchangeably, either in respect of the nature it self of the causes, or in respect of some external cause, which designeth and appointeth another cause to a certain effect: and because also the effects themselves cannot be more unchangeable, than are their causes: therefore there is said to be a double necessity:² One absolute or simple, which is of them, whose opposites or contraries are simply unpossible, in respect of the nature of the cause or subject whereof it is affirmed: as are the essential and personal properties of God: to wit, God is, God liveth, God is just, wise, &c. God is the eternal Father, Son, and holy Ghost. The other is necessity of consequence or by supposition, which is the immutability and unchangeableness of those effects which follow of causes, which causes being supposed or put, the effect must necessarily follow; but the causes notwithstanding themselves might either not have been, or might have been changed. So are those things necessary which God hath decreed that they should be done, in respect of the unchangeableness of his decree, which decree yet God most freely made; that is, he might from everlasting either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise, according to those words: Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he will give me moe than twelve legions of Angels? ³How then should the Scripture be fulfilled? Likewise, Those things are called necessary, which are done indeed by such second causes as are so made of God, that by their own nature, they cannot do otherwise than they do;

but yet may be by God himself either taken away, or hindered, or altered and changed: As the Sun, and the shadow going forward in consequence (or order of nature) with the Sun; and yet consisting and standing still in that battle of Joshua, and returning backwards in the days of Hezekiah: the fire, burning bodies within the reach thereof, which are capable of burning; and yet not burning the three Children in the furnace of Babylon: or those things which are indeed in their own nature apt to produce a contrary or diverse thing, or to forbear producing of their effect; and yet notwithstanding, cannot do otherwise, because they are so moved by God, or by other causes; which although they be not changed, yet might have been changed; or when they work so, cannot withal not work, or work otherwise, because two contradictories cannot be both at one time true.

but yet may be by God himselfe either taken away, or hindered, or altered and changed: As the Sun, and the shadow going forward in consequence (or order of nature) with the Sun; and yet consisting and standing still in that battell of Joshua, and returning backwards in the daies of Ezechias: the fire, burning bodies within the reach thereof, which are capable of burning; and yet not burning the three Children in the furnace of Babylon: or those things which are indeed in their own nature apt to produce a contrary or diverse thing, or to forbeare producing of their effect; and yet notwithstanding, cannot doe otherwise, because they are so moved by God, or by other causes; which although they be not changed, yet might have been changed; or when they worke so, cannot withall not worke, or worke otherwise, because two contradictories cannot be both at one time true.

¹Fortune and Chance are sometimes taken for the events themselves, or effects, which follow causes that are causes but by an accident, by reason of such causes as are causes by and in themselves, but not known to us: as when we say, good or evil fortune, happy or unhappy chance. Sometimes they signify the causes of such events: either ⟨p. 215⟩the manifest causes, which are causes but by an accident (as when any thing is said to be done by fortune, or by chance) or the hidden and unknown causes, which are causes by and in themselves: As it is said in the Poet: Omnipotent fortune and fate inevitable. And they are wont to call that fortune, which is a cause by an accident in voluntary agents, whose actions have some event, that seldom happeneth, besides their appointment: As he that digging with purpose to build, findeth treasure. Chance they call an accidental cause in natural agents, whose motions have effects, neither proper to them, neither always happening, and that without any manifest cause directing it: as if a tile falling from an house, kill one that passeth by.

¹Fortune and Chance are sometimes taken for the events themselves, or effects, which follow causes that are causes but by an accident, by reason of such causes as are causes by and in themselves, but not knowne to us: as when we say, good or evill fortune, happy or unhappy chance. Sometimes they signifie the causes of such events: either ⟨p. 215⟩the manifest causes, which are causes but by an accident (as when any thing is said to be done by fortune, or by chance) or the hidden and unknown causes, which are causes by and in themselves: As it is said in the Poet: Omnipotent fortune and fate inevitable. And they are wont to call that fortune, which is a cause by an accident in voluntary agents, whose actions have some event, that seldome happeneth, besides their appointment: As he that digging with purpose to build, findeth treasure. Chance they call an accidentall cause in naturall agents, whose motions have effects, neither proper to them, neither alwaies happening, and that without any manifest cause directing it: as if a tyle falling from an house, kill one that passeth by.

1. 1

¹By the name of Fate or Destiny, sometimes is understood the decree and providence of God: As that of the Poet, Leave off to hope that the fates of the Gods are moved with entreaty. But the Stoics by this word understood the immutable connection and knitting of all causes and effects, depending of the nature of the causes themselves; so that neither the second causes are able to work otherwise than they work, neither the first causes can work otherwise than doth the second; and therefore all effects of all causes are absolutely necessary. This opinion of the Stoics, because it spoileth God of his liberty and omnipotency, and abolisheth the order and manner of working in second causes, disposed by Gods wisdom, not only sounder Philosophy, but the Church also rejecteth and condemneth, and doth openly profess her dissenting from the Stoics: §11. Because the Stoics tie God to second causes, as if it should be necessary for him to work by them, as their nature doth bear and suffer. But the Church teacheth, that God worketh not according to the rule or lore of second causes; but second causes according to the prescript of God, as being their chief and most free Governor and Lord; and therefore are subject and tied to his will and pleasure. §22. The Stoics were of opinion, that neither God, n•r second causes, can do any thing of their own nature otherwise than they do. The Church affirmeth, that not only second causes are made and ordained by God, some to bring forth certain and definite effects, some variable and contrary; but God himself also could from everlasting either not have decreed, or have decreed and wrought otherwise, either by second causes, or without them, and by them either changeable in their own nature, or unchangeable, all things, whose contrary are not repugnant to his nature: and that he hath so decreed them, and doth so work them, not because he could not do otherwise; but because it so pleased him, as it is said: Our God is in heaven, he doth whatsoever he will. With God shall nothing be impossible: that is, which is not against his nature,² or whereby his nature is not overthrown, as it is said, 2 Tim. 2.

¹

Out of this then which hath been spoken, we answer unto the argument, which was, That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily: All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing therefore is done contingently, neither by fortune or chance, but all necessarily. First, we say, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses, when the opinion of the Stoics is objected to the Church: For albeit the Church confesseth all events in respect of Gods providence, to be necessary: yet this necessity is not a Stoical fate and destiny; because the Church defendeth against the Stoics, both liberty in God governing things at his pleasure, and a changeableness in second causes; and showeth out of Gods word, that God could both now do, and from everlasting have decreed many things, which neither he doth, nor hath decreed. And therefore the Church also hath abstained from the name of fate, lest any should suspect her to maintain with the Stoics an absolute necessity of all things. Secondly,¹ If removing Stoicism, yet notwithstanding the necessity of all things, and the abolishing of contingency, fortune, and chance, be objected: we make answer to the Major by distinguishing the words. For those things, which are done by the providence and decree of God, are done indeed necessarily; but by that necessity, which is by supposition, or of consequence, not by simple necessity or absolute: wherefore it followeth, that all things come to pass, not by simple and absolute necessity, but by that of supposition or consequence. And necessity of consequence doth not at all take ⟨p. 216⟩away contingency. The reason of this is: Because the same effect may have causes, whereof some may produce it by an order changeable, some by an unchangeable order; and therefore in respect of some it is contingent, and in respect of some, necessary. For as the originals or causes of contingency in things, are that liberty which is in the will of God, and Angels, and Men, and the mutable nature of the matter of the elements, together with the readiness or inclination thereof to divers motions and forms: so the cause of absolute necessity in God, is the very unchangeable nature of God;

Out of this then which hath been spoken, we answer unto the argument, which was, That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily: All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing therefore is done contingently, neither by fortune or chance, but all necessarily. First, wee say, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses, when the opinion of the Stoickes is objected to the Church: For albeit the Church confesseth all events in respect of Gods providence, to be necessary: yet this necessity is not a Stoicall fate and destiny; because the Church detendeth against the Stoickes, both liberty in God governing things at his pleasure, and a changeablenes in second causes; and sheweth out of Gods word, that God could both now doe, and from everlasting have decreed many things, which neither he doth, nor hath decreed. And therefore the Church also hath abstained from the name of fate, lest any should suspect her to maintaine with the Stoickes an absolute necessity of all things. Secondly,