A64989:102
The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so…
The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so generally believed doctrines of the Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence, of the satisfaction of Christ, the second person of the real and glorious Trinity, of the justification of the ungodly by the imputed righteousness of Christ, against the cavils of W.P.J. a Quaker in his pamphlet entitled The sandy foundation shaken &c. : wherein his and the Quakers hideous blasphemies, Socinian and damnably-heretical opinions are discovered and refuted ... / by Thomas Vincent.The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so generally believed doctrines of the Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence, of the satisfaction of Christ, the second person of the real and glorious Trinity, of the justification of the ungodly by the imputed righteousness of Christ, against the cavils of W.P.J. a Quaker in his pamphlet entituled The sandy foundation shaken &c. : wherein his and the Quakers hideous blasphemies, Socinian and damnably-heretical opinions are discovered and refuted ... / by Thomas Vincent.
London : s.n., 1668
Chapter 6: Ananswer to part of the 10, the 12, 13, 14, and 15 pages of W. P's Pamphlet, which he i…
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
W. P's. third Argument is this: If each person be God, and that God subsists in three persons, then in each person there are three persons or Gods, and so from three they would increase to nine, and so in infinitum.
Answer: W. P. confoundeth again the concrete and the abstract together; it is granted that each person is God in the concrete, and that God (not in the concrete but in the abstract God essentially or the Essence of God,) doth subsist in three persons, from whence, it doth not at all follow that there be three persons in each person, but that there are three persons in one Godhead, and so his consequence of the persons increasing to nine, and ad infinitum, is both ridiculous and absurd.
Answer: W. P. confoundeth again the concrete and the abstract together; it is granted that each person is God in the concrete, and that God (not in the concrete but in the abstract God essentially or the Essence of God,) doth subsist in three persons, from whence, it doth not at all follow that there be three persons in each person, but that there are three persons in one Godhead, and so his consequence of the persons encreasing to nine, and ad infinitum, is both ridiculous and absurd.
W. P's. fourth argument being built upon the supposition that we deny the persons to be infinite, which we have affirmed, it proveth nothing, and therefore requireth no answer; and I have not leisure to trace him with remarks upon his absurd arguings upon a ⟨p. 47⟩false supposition, which he conceived we might have.
W. P's. fourth argument being built upon the supposition that we deny the persons to be infinite, which we have affirmed, it proveth nothing, and therefore requireth no answer; and I have not leasure to trace him with remarks upon his absurd arguings upon a