A64989:97
The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so…
The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so generally believed doctrines of the Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence, of the satisfaction of Christ, the second person of the real and glorious Trinity, of the justification of the ungodly by the imputed righteousness of Christ, against the cavils of W.P.J. a Quaker in his pamphlet entitled The sandy foundation shaken &c. : wherein his and the Quakers hideous blasphemies, Socinian and damnably-heretical opinions are discovered and refuted ... / by Thomas Vincent.The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so generally believed doctrines of the Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence, of the satisfaction of Christ, the second person of the real and glorious Trinity, of the justification of the ungodly by the imputed righteousness of Christ, against the cavils of W.P.J. a Quaker in his pamphlet entituled The sandy foundation shaken &c. : wherein his and the Quakers hideous blasphemies, Socinian and damnably-heretical opinions are discovered and refuted ... / by Thomas Vincent.
London : s.n., 1668
Chapter 6: Ananswer to part of the 10, the 12, 13, 14, and 15 pages of W. P's Pamphlet, which he i…
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
consequently, if the Doctrine of the Trinity of subsistences were true, there would be three Gods. And in his first argument he argueth that every person is inseparable from it's own substance, and therefore Father, Son, and Spirit either are three distinct nothings; or if persons, then three distinct substances, and consequently three distinct Gods.
Answer: If Substance be taken here for Essence (as it must be,) otherwise it will conclude nothing against us, then the proposition is most false: that no one substance can have three distinct subsistences, and preserve it's own unity; for though a created Essence being finite, limited, and divisible, cannot be communicated unto any more than one subsistence; yet it ⟨p. 44⟩followeth not that the divine Essence which is infinite and indivisible, cannot be communicated to several subsistences; neither doth W. P's. reason prove the contrary, viz: that every subsistence will have it's own substance, unless he can prove that each distinct subsistence must necessarily have it's own substance, (in God as well as Creatures) distinct from what the other subsistences have; For one and the same singular nature or substance may be, and is the substance or nature subsisting in each person of the Trinity; and so every subsistence hath it's own substance, and yet not distinct, but one and the same, and therefore as three Essences, so three Gods cannot be concluded from hence; and though every person in the Trinity be inseparable from it's substance, yet it doth not follow that the substance must be distinct in every person, though the persons be distinct, neither doth it follow that the persons are either three distinct nothings, (as W. P. blasphemously reproacheth the ever glorious Trinity,) or three distinct Gods, because the distinction is in regard of the personality, and not in regard of the Essence, and whereas Pag. 10. he seemeth to add another reason, why the infinite Godhead cannot subsist in three manners or forms, (he means the three persons) because then one of them could not be a complete subsistence without the other two, and so parts, and something finite would be in God; or if infinite, then there would be three distinct infinite subsistences, and by consequence there would be three distinct Gods.