A64989:99
The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so…
The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so generally believed doctrines of the Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence, of the satisfaction of Christ, the second person of the real and glorious Trinity, of the justification of the ungodly by the imputed righteousness of Christ, against the cavils of W.P.J. a Quaker in his pamphlet entitled The sandy foundation shaken &c. : wherein his and the Quakers hideous blasphemies, Socinian and damnably-heretical opinions are discovered and refuted ... / by Thomas Vincent.The foundation of God standeth sure, or, A defence of those fundamental and so generally believed doctrines of the Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence, of the satisfaction of Christ, the second person of the real and glorious Trinity, of the justification of the ungodly by the imputed righteousness of Christ, against the cavils of W.P.J. a Quaker in his pamphlet entituled The sandy foundation shaken &c. : wherein his and the Quakers hideous blasphemies, Socinian and damnably-heretical opinions are discovered and refuted ... / by Thomas Vincent.
London : s.n., 1668
Chapter 6: Ananswer to part of the 10, the 12, 13, 14, and 15 pages of W. P's Pamphlet, which he i…
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Answer: Each person is a complete person or subsistent without the personality or subsistence of the other two, that is, distinct from the other two; but not without the substance of the other two, which is the same in all three, from whence it doth no ways follow that parts or something finite is in God nor ⟨p. 45⟩that there are three infinite subsistences, for though in the concrete every subsistent is infinite, yet in the abstract infiniteness is not applicable to the subsistence: of which more in answer to the second argument, which is to the same purpose with the close of this page 13.
Answer: Each person is a compleat person or subsistent without the personality or subsistence of the other two, that is, distinct from the other two; but not without the substance of the other two, which is the same in all three, from whence it doth no ways follow that parts or something finite is in God nor ⟨p. 45⟩that there are three infinite subsistences, for though in the concrete every subsistent is infinite, yet in the abstract infinitenesse is not applicable to the subsistance: of which more in answer to the second argument, which is to the same purpose with the close of this page 13.
2. Arg. The Divine persons are either finite or infinite; if finite, then something finite is in God; if infinite, then there would be three distinct infinites, and consequently three Gods.
Answer: The Divine persons or subsistents are infinite in the concrete. The Father is infinite, the Son is infinite, the Holy Ghost is infinite, the Father is omnipotent, the Son omnipotent. and the Holy Ghost omnipotent, and yet three are not three infinites, or three omnipotents, but one infinite, one omnipotent; and the reason is because these and all other essential attributes agree to the persons, only in regard of the Essence from whence they flow, and therefore though person or subsistent in the concrete be infinite, omnipotent, and the like, in regard of the Essence included therein; yet this can not be properly ascribed to the subsistence or personality, therefore though there be three distinct personalities, unto which infiniteness is not ascribed, yet there being but one and the same single Essence in all the three persons, unto which infiniteness is attributed, it doth not follow that there are three infinites, or the consequence that there are three Gods. But W. P. in his arguings confoundeth the person with the personality, the subsistent with the subsistence, the concrete with the abstract, taking the former for the latter; but if he should understand the person in the abstract for the personality or subsistence, then it is denied that either finiteness for infiniteness doth properly