A69129:141
Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof
Conscience with the power and cases thereof Divided into V. books. Written by the godly and learned, William Ames, Doctor, and Professor of Divinity, in the famous University of Franeker in Friesland. Translated out of Latin into English, for more public benefit.Conscience with the power and cases thereof Devided into V. bookes. Written by the godly and learned, William Ames, Doctor, and Professor of Divinity, in the famous University of Franeker in Friesland. Translated out of Latine into English, for more publique benefit.
Leiden and London : Imprinted W. Christiaens, E. Griffin, J. Dawson, Anno MDCXXIX 1639Leyden and London : Imprinted W. Christiaens, E. Griffin, J. Dawson, Anno MDCXXIX 1639
Book 1 › Chapter 7: Of the attention of Conscience to its Facts.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3. The Will cannot will, desire, choose, or follow after any thing, without a speculative apprehension of it, because the object of the will is known Good. No man was ever known to desire what he no ways knew.
3. The Will cannot will, desire, choose, or follow after any thing, without a speculatiue apprehension of it, because the object of the will is knowne Good. No man was ever knowne to desire what hee no waies knew.
4. A bare and simple apprehension of the object, without any practical judgement, that forthwith it must be prosecuted, or avoided, may be sufficient to draw forth the Act of the Will. This appeareth sufficiently in Mad men, Infants, and in every undeliberate motion of the Will. The reason of this is, because a Good, apprehended or known, hath all those Conditions, which are required to the Object of the Will. The Will is as able about its Object, as the sensitive appetite is about its: But Sense is stirred up at the apprehension of its object, as the Eye at sight of Colours, the Ear at Sounds, &c.
4. A bare and simple apprehension of the object, without any practicall judgement, that forthwith it must be prosequuted, or avoided, may be sufficient to draw forth the Act of the Will. This appeareth sufficiently in Mad men, Infants, and in every undeliberate motion of the Will. The reason of this is, because a Good, apprehended or knowne, hath all those Conditions, which are required to the Object of the Will. The Will is as able about its Object, as the sensitiue appetite is about its: But Sense is stirred up at the apprehension of its object, as the Eye at sight of Colours, the Eare at Sounds, &c.
5 The Will can at pleasure suspend its act about that which is apprehended and judged to be good, without any foregoing act of judgement, that it should do so; for if to suspend an act, and to leave of acting, an act of judgement, be necessarily required; then to suspend that judgement, another judgement is requisite; and to suspend that, another; and so in infinitum.