A69129:33
Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof
Conscience with the power and cases thereof Divided into V. books. Written by the godly and learned, William Ames, Doctor, and Professor of Divinity, in the famous University of Franeker in Friesland. Translated out of Latin into English, for more public benefit.Conscience with the power and cases thereof Devided into V. bookes. Written by the godly and learned, William Ames, Doctor, and Professor of Divinity, in the famous University of Franeker in Friesland. Translated out of Latine into English, for more publique benefit.
Leiden and London : Imprinted W. Christiaens, E. Griffin, J. Dawson, Anno MDCXXIX 1639Leyden and London : Imprinted W. Christiaens, E. Griffin, J. Dawson, Anno MDCXXIX 1639
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3 By the definition of Conscience, it appeareth that Conscience is not a contemplative judgement, whereby truth is simply discerned from falsehood: but a practical judgement, by which, that which a man knoweth is particularly applied to that which is either good or evil to him, to the end that it may be a rule within him to direct his will.1
3 By the definition of Conscience, it appeareth that Conscience is not a contemplatiue judgement, whereby truth is simply discerned from falsehood: but a practicall judgement, by which, that which a man knoweth is particularly applyed to that which is either good or evill to him, to the end that it may be a rule within him to direct his will.1
- 1Whether Conscience be a Faculty, Habit, or Act.Whether Conscience be a Facultie, Habit, or Act.
Seeing that this name of judgement, is sometimes taken for a power and faculty, sometimes for an habit, sometimes for an act; this question ariseth, to which of all these Conscience is properly.
4 The most grave Divine, William Perkins, who only of our Countrymen hath set forth a peculiar Treatise of Conscience, doth place it among Faculties; and he doth so define it, as he putteth for the general nature of it a part of the Understanding, that is to say, as he explains himself, A natural power or faculty. He gives this reason of his opinion, namely, because the act of Accusing, Comforting, Terrifying, &c. cannot be ascribed to the Conscience, if it self were an act. Put this reason is weak: because in the Scriptures such kinds of effects are attributed to the thoughts themselves, which undoubtedly are acts.