A69129:87
Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof
Conscience with the power and cases thereof Divided into V. books. Written by the godly and learned, William Ames, Doctor, and Professor of Divinity, in the famous University of Franeker in Friesland. Translated out of Latin into English, for more public benefit.Conscience with the power and cases thereof Devided into V. bookes. Written by the godly and learned, William Ames, Doctor, and Professor of Divinity, in the famous University of Franeker in Friesland. Translated out of Latine into English, for more publique benefit.
Leiden and London : Imprinted W. Christiaens, E. Griffin, J. Dawson, Anno MDCXXIX 1639Leyden and London : Imprinted W. Christiaens, E. Griffin, J. Dawson, Anno MDCXXIX 1639
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
To bind to a thing, (Obligare) is by some in regard of the object, or thing bound to, distinguished thus. One is either bound to do according to Conscience erring, or to lay aside that Conscience. But this distinction is not exact, because Conscience bindeth not, but so far as it doth dictate, or declare a thing: now no Conscience while it erreth doth declare, that the error thereof is to be left, Or that it self is not to be regarded, because it is erroneous.
To binde to a thing, (Obligare) is by some in regard of the object, or thing bound to, distinguished thus. One is either bound to doe according to Conscience erring, or to lay aside that Conscience. But this distinction is not exact, because Conscience bindeth not, but so farre as it doth dictate, or declare a thing: now no Conscience while it erreth doth declare, that the error thereof is to be left, Or that it selfe is not to be regarded, because it is erroneous.
Others put a difference between that Obligation, whereby one is tied to do what Conscience commandeth, and that whereby one is tied not to do the contrary. But neither is this distinction always good. For if a mans Conscience told him he might lie to save his life, he must either lye, or of necessity go against his Conscience.
Others put a difference between that Obligation, whereby one is tied to doe what Conscience commandeth, and that wherby one is tied not to do the contrary. But neither is this distinction alwaies good. For if a mans Conscience told him he might lie to saue his life, he must either lye, or of necessitie goe against his Conscience.
6 Out of these grounds the question may be thus1