The second question is concerning simulation 1or feigning, and dissimulation or disguising. Simulation is, when by word, action, or any other sign that is feigned to be which is not. Dissimulation is when as by any of these means any thing is disguised and hid, which in truth is. Now the question is whether either of these can be judged lawful and justly acquitted from being a lye. For the former, we must answer by distinction; for either the thing feigned hath no being at all, either in reality and truth, or in reason and signification; or else though ⟨p. 37⟩it have no existence properly and in the very nature of the thing, yet it hath an improper and figurative being by which it signifieth and representeth something that is. If the thing feigned have no being at all, then is it all one with a lye; but though it have no being in reality, yet if it have a being in the reason of the thing, and be brought to signify, demonstrate and illustrate something that is, then is it no lye, but wholly tendeth to the setting forth of truth: and of this kind are many poetical fictions, fables, apologies and parables. So Saint Augustine, not all that which we 2feign is a lye, but then it is a lye, when as we feign that which signifieth nothing. But when our fiction is referred to some signification, it is not a lye, but some figure of truth; otherwise all those things which are spoken figuratively of wise and holy Men, yea even God himself should be thought lies, because according to common understanding truth is not in such speeches. As for example, the parable of the prodigal was not really and properly true, but figuratively and in the reason and signification of it. So our Saviours coming to look for fruit on the fig tree when the time of bearing was not, had in it no real intention to find fruit upon it, seeing every one might know that in such a season it could have none; but it was feigned, that (as it were) under this real parable, he might signify that they who brought forth no 3fruits were under the curse. And therefore (as he saith) a fiction which is referred to some truth is a figure, and that which is not thus referred is a lye. Secondly, we may distinguish of the purpose and ⟨p. 38⟩resolution of our mind and heart of doing or not doing what we feign and make show of. For either it is absolute, or conditional.
The second question is concerning simulation 1or faining, and dissimulation or disguising. Simulation is, when by word, action, or any other signe that is fained to be which is not. Dissimulation is when as by any of these means any thing is disguised and hid, which in truth is. Now the question is whether either of these can be judged lawfull and justly acquitted from being a lye. For the former, we must answer by distinction; for either the thing fained hath no being at all, either in reality and truth, or in reason and signification; or else though ⟨p. 37⟩it have no existence properly and in the very nature of the thing, yet it hath an improper and figurative being by which it signifieth and representeth something that is. If the thing fained have no being at all, then is it all one with a lye; but though it have no being in reality, yet if it haue a being in the reason of the thing, and bee brought to signifie, demonstrate and illustrate something that is, then is it no lye, but wholly tendeth to the setting forth of truth: and of this kinde are many poeticall fictions, fables, apologies and parables. So Saint Augustine, not all that which wee 2faine is a lye, but then it is a lye, when as we faine that which signifieth nothing. But when our fiction is referred to some signification, it is not a lye, but some figure of truth; otherwise all those things which are spoken figuratively of wise and holy Men, yea even God himselfe should bee thought lyes, because according to common understanding truth is not in such speeches. As for example, the parable of the prodigall was not really and properly true, but figuratively and in the reason and signification of it. So our Saviours comming to looke for fruite on the figge tree when the time of bearing was not, had in it no reall intention to finde fruite upon it, seeing every one might know that in such a season it could have none; but it was fained, that (as it were) under this reall parable, he might signifie that they who brought forth no 3fruites were under the curse. And therefore (as he saith) a fiction which is referred to some truth is a figure, and that which is not thus referred is a lye. Secondly, wee may distinguish of the purpose and ⟨p. 38⟩resolution of our minde and heart of doing or not doing what we faine and make shew of. For either it is absolute, or conditionall.
- 1§. 3. The second question propoundedand discussed, and first of simulation lawful and unlawful.§. 3. The second question propoundedand discussed, and first of simulation lawfull and unlawfull.
- 2Non omne quod singimus mendaciū est, sed quando id singimus quod nihil significat, &c. Quaest. Evangel. lib. 2. cap. 51.Non omne quod singimus mendaciū est, sed quando id singimus quod nihil significat, &c. Quaest. Evangel. lib. 2. cap. 51.
- 3Fictio quae ad aliquam veritatem refertur figura est: quae non refertur mendacium est Aug. ibid.
