A treatise against lying Wherein is showed what it is, the nature and causes…A treatise against lying Wherein is shevved vvhat it is, the nature and causes…

Now if in show or words I feign that I will do that which I have absolutely resolved not to do, then do I lye, whether I do or do it not, because my words and significations disagree from my mind and heart. But if my resolution were only conditional, then it dependeth upon the performance of the condition, and I may do a thing resolved on, or not do it without lying, as the condition is observed or not observed. As for example, if I go to a friends house with a resolution to return home to my own supper, if he do not use some importunity in desiring me to stay supper with him: then if I feign that I will go home and use some earnestness that I may take leave, I lye not if I go away, though I desired to stay, being not at all, or but slightly entreated; nor yet if I stay, though I made show that I would depart, if importunity be used; because my resolution was conditional, and I was truly purposed to depart, if not earnestly invited, or to stay and sup with my friend, if he instantly desired it. Lastly, we may distinguish of the divers ends which they that feign do aim at in their feigning. For either their aim is to deceive their neighbour in making him to believe that which is not true, or to do him some other hurt; or else that they may hereby benefit themselves or others. The former is to be reputed a lye, yea such a lye as is hurtful and pernicious: as when men feign themselves to be pious and religious, when as in truth they are impious and profane, the which ⟨p. 39⟩is damnable hypocrisy, and this feigned piety, double iniquity; or when outwardly by their words and shows they feign love and friendship when as their hearts are full of enmity, that they may get the fitter opportunity of revenge, and executing their malice. These men lye in their feigning, seeing their minds disagree from their words and shows, and because also their end and aim is to deceive and hurt.

Now if in shew or words I faine that I will doe that which I have absolutely resolved not to do, then doe I lye, whether I doe or doe it not, because my words and significations disagree from my minde and heart. But if my resolution were onely conditionall, then it dependeth upon the performance of the condition, and I may doe a thing resolved on, or not doe it without lying, as the condition is observed or not observed. As for example, if I goe to a friendes house with a resolution to returne home to my owne supper, if he doe not use some importunity in desiring me to stay supper with him: then if I faine that I will goe home and use some earnestnesse that I may take leave, I lye not if I goe away, though I desired to stay, being not at all, or but sleightly intreated; nor yet if I stay, though I made shew that I would depart, if importunity bee used; because my resolution was conditionall, and I was truely purposed to depart, if not earnestly invited, or to stay and suppe with my friend, if he instantly desired it. Lastly, wee may distinguish of the divers ends which they that faine do aime at in their faining. For either their aime is to deceive their neighbour in making him to beleeve that which is not true, or to doe him some other hurt; or else that they may hereby benefit themselves or others. The former is to be reputed a lye, yea such a lye as is hurtfull and pernicious: as when men faine themselves to be pious and religious, when as in truth they are impious and prophane, the which