Five disputations of church-government and worship

§. 25. Object. That cannot be: For, a General command of doing good to all, obligeth not a Minister any more then another man: But it obligeth not another man to Preach, administer Sacraments, &c. therefore it obligeth not a Minister. Answ. To the Major I answer, that 1. It may oblige to more, where it obligeth not more, as to the Essence of the obligation. 2. The General command obligeth several men to several acts according to their several Abilities, opportunities and capacities. If all be required to improve their Masters flock or talents, yet all are not required to improve the same talents, because they have not the same: But one hath Riches to improve, and the general command obligeth him to improve that talent: And another hath strength, another interest and friends, another wit, and another learning, and every man is bound to improve what he hath, and not what he hath not. The command of Doing good to all doth oblige a Physician to help to cure men, and a Magistrate to benefit them by Government, and a Lawyer by Counsel for their estates, and a Minister by the works of a Minister, for their salvation. If you should say that [this General command doth bind a Magistrate, or a Physician no more then another man: but it bindeth not another man to do good by Ruling or by Physic, therefore neither doth it bind them;] would not the fallacy be obvious? So is it here.

§. 25. Object. That cannot be: For, a General command of doing good to all, obligeth not a Minister any more then another man: But it obligeth not another man to Preach, administer Sacraments, &c. therefore it obligeth not a Minister. Answ. To the Major I answer, that 1. It may oblige to more, where it obligeth not more, as to the Essence of the obligation. 2. The General command obligeth several men to several acts according to their several Abilities, opportunities and capacities. If all be required to improve their Masters flock or talents, yet all are not required to improve the same talents, because they have not the same: But one hath Riches to improve, and the general command obligeth him to improve that talent: And another hath strength, another interest and friends, another wit, and another learning, and every man is bound to improve what he hath, and not what he hath not. The command of Doing good to all doth oblige a Physitian to help to cure men, and a Magistrate to benefit them by Government, and a Lawyer by Counsell for their estates, and a Minister by the works of a Minister, for their salvation. If you should say that [this General command doth bind a Magistrate, or a Physitian no more then another man: but it bindeth not another man to do good by Ruling or by Physick, therefore neither doth it bind them;] would not the fallacy be obvious? So is it here.