§. 13. To this I say, 1. Many things simply considered are Indifferent (as to marry or not marry, which Paul disputeth of,) which yet being clothed with accidents, or Circumstances, shall ordinarily be a Duty, or a sin in the Use to a particular person. 2. Nothing is Indifferent between Lawful and Unlawful; but many things are Indifferent between a Duty and a Sin. 3. I conceive that where any thing is Indifferent ⟨p. 437⟩between Duty and sin, in the Use, as Circumstantiated, it is not actus humanus, a proper moral act. But as Permission is vainly numbered with proper acts of Law, it being but a Non impedire, a Negation of an act; so Indifferency is as vainly annumerated to the products of a Law. For there needs no act of Law to make a thing Indifferent, that is Neither commanded nor forbidden. For instance, it is Indifferent for me to wink with my eyes ordinarily, because it is not a Moral act that a man is to use his reason about, to bring every twink of the eye to an Election, or Refusal; but we may leave it to Natural instinct. So in Dr. Burgesses instances, Whether I sit or stand at Sermon, (if I be equally disposed, & caeteris paribus) is not a humane Moral act: Whether I eat this Egg or that when they are equal, is not a Moral act: Nor do I properly Choose, but take indifferently without choice. And where there is no use of choice, the act is not Moral, except in the Intention of the end, or in deliberating accesses.) Yet I grant that Moral acts may be exercised about these objects: A scrupulous mind may be put to consider, whether this Gesture or that, this Egg or that is to be chosen: but it must conclude, that neither is to be chosen, but either to be taken Indifferently. Which is but to say, that the Deliberation was a Moral act; but the choosing was not, for it was but a Taking, and not a Choosing: And the Deliberation stopped before it came to a choice, yea and purposely avoided it, concluding that the object was not a Matter of choice, and the act was not to be a Moral act: Morality hath but two Species, Good and Evil: and Indifferency is no third Species, but a Negation of Morality: viz. of Good or Evil.
§. 13. To this I say, 1. Many things simply considered are Indifferent (as to marry or not marry, which Paul disputeth of,) which yet being cloathed with accidents, or Circumstances, shall ordinarily be a Duty, or a sin in the Vse to a particular person. 2. Nothing is Indifferent between Lawfull and Vnlawfull; but many things are Indifferent between a Duty and a Sin. 3. I conceive that where any thing is Indifferent ⟨p. 437⟩between Duty and sin, in the Vse, as Circumstantiated, it is not actus humanus, a proper morall act. But as Permission is vainly numbred with proper acts of Law, it being but a Non impedire, a Negation of an act; so Indifferency is as vainly annumerated to the products of a Law. For there needs no act of Law to make a thing Indifferent, that is Neither commanded nor forbidden. For instance, it is Indifferent for me to wink with my eyes ordinarily, because it is not a Moral act that a man is to use his reason about, to bring every twink of the eye to an Election, or Refusal; but we may leave it to Natural instinct. So in Dr. Burgesses instances, Whether I sit or stand at Sermon, (if I be equally disposed, & caeteris paribus) is not a humane Moral act: Whether I eat this Egg or that when they are equal, is not a Moral act: Nor do I properly Choose, but take indifferently without choice. And where there is no use of choice, the act is not Moral, except in the Intention of the end, or in deliberating accesses.) Yet I grant that Moral acts may be exercised about these objects: A scrupulous mind may be put to consider, whether this Gesture or that, this Egg or that is to be chosen: but it must conc•ude, that neither is to be chosen, but either to be taken Indifferently. Which is but to say, that the Deliberation was a Moral act; but the choosing was not, for it was but a Taking, and not a Choosing: And the Deliberation stopt before it came to a choice, yea and purposely avoided it, concluding that the object was not a Matter of choice, and the act was not to be a Moral act: Morality hath but two Species, Good and Evil: and Indifferency is no third Species, but a Negation of Morality: viz. of Good or Evil.
