A69536:198
The judgment of non-conformists about the difference between grace and morality
London : s.n., 1676
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Pr. 40. If Good as Good be amiable, then the greatest Good as such is most amiable, and to be preferred before the less: And when the difference is known, or such as Rulers are obliged to know, the less cannot be preferred without sin; and such as is against the very Nature of Goodness, and of Man's Will. It is not therefore a thing indifferent, nor the matter of God's Counsel, which is no Law.
Pr. 40. If Good as Good be amiable, then the greatest Good as such is most amiable, and to be preferrd before the less: And when the difference is known, or such as Rulers are obliged to know, the less cannot be preferred without sin; and such as is against the very Nature of Goodness, and of Man's Will. It is not therefore a thing indifferent, nor the matter of God's Counsel, which is no Law.
Pr. 41. But to know of several Goods which is most eligible, or the greatest, is a matter of great difficulty in many Instances, in which consisteth no small part of the Christian Wisdom, Work, and Life. The Rules of such discerning are elsewhere laid down, by such as have written on that Subject; see Christian Direct. p. 137. &c.
Pr. 42. A Good that in it self is Lesser may be the matter of a Greater Duty, pro hic & nunc, because the Greater may have another season when the Lesser cannot: E. G. to save a Soul, or to build a Church may be a better work than to quench the Fire in an House: And yet for that time the quenching of the Fire may be the greater Duty, because it can be done no other time, when the other may; and so both done in their several seasons are better than one alone.