Vindiciæ legis

7. This Covenant did suppose in Adam a power, being assisted by ⟨p. 127⟩God, to keep it; and therefore that which is now impossible to us, was possible to him. And certainly, if there had been a necessity to sin, it would have been either from his nature, or from the Devil: Not from his nature, for then he would have excused himself by this, when he endeavoured to clear himself. But Tertullian speaks wittily, Nunquam figulo suo dixit, Non prudenter definxisti me, rudis admodum haereticus fuit, non obaudiit, non tamen blasphemavit creatorem, lib. 2. ad Mar. cap. 2. Nor could any necessity arise from the Devil, whose temptations cannot reach beyond a moral suasion. Therefore our Divines do well argue, that if God did not work in our conversion beyond a moral suasion, he should no further cause a work good, then Satan doth evil.

7. This Covenant did suppose in Adam a power, being assisted by ⟨p. 127⟩God, to keep it; and therefore that which is now impossible to us, was possible to him. And certainly, if there had been a necessity to sin, it would have been either from his nature, or from the Divell: Not from his nature, for then he would have excused himselfe by this, when he endeavoured to cleare himselfe. But Tertullian speakes wittily, Nunquam figulo suo dixit, Non prudenter definxisti me, rudis admodum haereticus fuit, non obaudiit, non tamen blasphemavit creatorem, lib. 2. ad Mar. cap. 2. Nor could any necessity arise from the Divell, whose temptations cannot reach beyond a morall swasion. Therefore our Divines doe well argue, that if God did not work in our conversion beyond a morall swasion, hee should no further cause a work good, then Satan doth evill.

Nor could this necessity be of God, who made him good and righteous: nor would God subtract his gifts from him before he sinned, seeing his fall was the cause of his defection, not Gods deserting of him the cause of his fall. Therefore, although God did not give Adam such an help, that de facto would hinder his fall, yet he gave him so much, that might and ought to prevent it. And upon this ground it is, that we answer all those cavils, why God doth command of us that which is impossible for us to do: for the things commanded are not impossible in themselves, but, when required of Adam, he had power to keep them; but he sinned away that power from himself and us. Neither is God bound, as the Arminians fancy, to give every one power to believe and repent, because Adam in innocency had not ability to do these; for he had them eminently and virtually, though not formally: But more of these things in the Covenant of grace.