The moderator

Concerning the first, there can be nor condescension proposed which should oblige any to make profession of any thing otherwise then it is in his heart. For no man can with a good conscience yield to profess any untruth, or transact to relinquish his sense and opinion of any thing which he doth esteem a point of truth or of right, I say no man can condescend to relinquish his opinion, or his challenge of a right to a privilege: because the matters of truth and right can edify no man, but disedifie both our selves and others, if they be denied and professedly given up. A man may dispense with a truth so far as not to speak of it, to all sorts of persons, or at all times, because they cannot bear it, nor is it seasonable for edification to speak all truths at all times: as we may see by Christs example, John 16. 12. and the Apostles practise, 1 Cor. 3. 1, 2. and the rules, Matth. 7. 6. and Rom. 14. 1. And concerning a point of right a man may dispense with the use of it, as we see the Apostle doth, 1 Cor. 9. But no man ought to yield himself obliged to deny any truth, or not to bear witness to it when it is opposed, or ⟨p. 64⟩not to challenge his right to a privilege, when it is called in question, for to do so were to betray truth and righteousness, which cannot stand with a good conscience: therefore no condescension may be intended to suppress the profession of these things, but rather a transaction is to be intended to this purpose, that both sides shall bear with one another in such a profession without offence, and grant a freedom to each other to declare the truth, as it is in their hearts, for this is the duty and one of the commendable characters of those, that shall abide in the tabernacle of God and dwell in his holy hill, Psal. 15. 1, 2.

Concerning the first, there can bee nor condescension proposed which should oblige any to make profession of any thing otherwise then it is in his heart. For no man can with a good conscience yeeld to professe any untruth, or transact to relinquish his sense and opinion of any thing which hee doth esteeme a point of truth or of right, I say no man can condescend to relinquish his opinion, or his challenge of a right to a priviledge: because the matters of truth and right can edifie no man, but disedifie both our selves and others, if they bee denyed and professedly given up. A man may dispense with a truth so farre as not to speak of it, to all sorts of persons, or at all times, because they cannot beare it, nor is it seasonable for edification to speake all truths at all times: as wee may see by Christs example,