I answer: We must look upon threatenings as a part of the Law, declaring the dueness of the punishment, what the offender hath deserved to suffer; not as predictions of the event, any more than Thou shalt, and Thou shalt not in the command, are predictions: but only are expressive of the dueness of obedience. Nor will it hence follow, that we have the least cause once to suspect that God may (if he please) revoke his promises, as well as his threatenings; and then what would become of us? for there is a wide ⟨p. 416⟩difference in their essential natures and properties. In a promise, the obligation lies upon the party promising; he hath past away his own liberty, and the thing is now no longer his, but the others, who may if he please, release and quit-claim to his pretensions; he may dispense with, and surrender his own right; but if he claim his right to, and interest in the benefit, by virtue of the promise, it cannot be detained without notorious wrong and injury, which God forbid we should charge him with; for he were not God, if he were not infinitely true and faithful. How should he else judge the world? But now the Obligation unto punishment lies contrarily upon the sinner threatened; he hath past away his own indemnity, and given God the right of punishing him: I say the right, not the necessity; if God will claim this right, he may; but if he please, he may dispense with it. It is no injury if he punisheth; yet no Obligation lies upon him but his own honour: And that indeed obligeth him not, never to dispense with his Law; but never to dispense with it upon a light cause, or upon terms misbecoming his Glorious Attributes. And the dispensation we now speak of is an honourable one; for
I answer: We must look upon threatnings as a part of the Law, declaring the duenesse of the punishment, what the offender hath deserved to suffer; not as predictions of the event, any more than Thou shalt, and Thou shalt not in the command, are predictions: but only are expressive of the duenesse of obedience. Nor will it hence follow, that we have the least cause once to suspect that God may (if he please) revoke his promises, as well as his threatnings; and then what would become of us? for there is a wide ⟨p. 416⟩difference in their essential natures and properties. In a promise, the obligation lies upon the party promising; he hath past away his own liberty, and the thing is now no longer his, but the others, who may if he please, release and quit-claim to his pretensions; he may dispense with, and surrender his own right; but if he claime his right to, and interest in the benefit, by vertue of the promise, it cannot be detained without notorious wrong and injury, which God forbid we should charge him with; for he were not God, if he were not infinitely true and faithful. How should he •lse judge the world? But now the Obligation unto punishment lies contrarily upon the sinner threatned; he hath past away his own indemnity, and given God the right of punishing him: I say the right, not the necessity; if God will claime this right, he may; but if he please, he may dispence with it. It is no injury if he punisheth; yet no Obligation lies upon him but his own honour: And that indeed obligeth him not, never to dispence with his Law; but never to dispense with it upon a light cause, or upon termes misbecoming his Glorious Attributes. And the dispensation we now speak of is an honourable one; for